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NON-ALJADJUDICATORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal administrative adjudication dwarfs federal judicial
adjudication in volume and variety.' Some agency adjudications,
such as those over which approximately 2,000 administrative law
judges (ALJs)2 preside, share a statutory framework under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA also provides
uniform provisions that seek to protect ALJs from undue agency
interference with their decision-making.3 This framework permits
relatively easy interagency comparison and discussion.
But these APA hearings are only a fraction of agencies'
adjudicatory hearings. Instead, most administrative hearings are
before adjudicators who are not ALJs. These adjudicators-who
number more than 10,000-go by numerous titles but are often
collectively called "non-ALJ adjudicators," "non-ALJ-hearing
officers," "administrative judges," or variations of those terms. 4 In
this paper, we use the simpler (and admittedly imprecise) term
"non-ALJs." Likewise, we refer to (and define in more detail below)
the hearings over which they preside as "Non-ALJ Hearings."
Neither these Non-ALJ Hearings nor the non-ALJs themselves
share a statutory framework, whether under the APA or other
statute.5 As a result, there are many differences among various
agencies' proceedings and in characteristics of their non-ALJs.
These differences render it difficult to describe and analyze those
characteristics and proceedings comparatively and to offer
recommendations for non-ALJs collectively.
1 See Chris Guthrie et al., The "Hidden Judiciary" An Empirical Examination of
Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1479 (2009) ("At the federal level, ALJs
conduct at least nine times as many trials as federal judges.").
2 See Joe Davidson, Trump Order Risks 'Politicization'of Administrative, Mostly Social
Security, Judiciary, WASH. POST, July 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2018/07/13/trump-order-risks-politicization-of-administrative-judiciary/
?utm term=.d9fcalb02240 (noting that "ALJs are a small fraction of the federal workforce,
about 2,000 of 2 million employees").
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part V.A. 1.
5 See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1649
(2016) ("Unlike with ALJs, agencies face no statutory impediment to controlling AJ's
appointment, job performance, or termination.").
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Judicial doctrine over the past few decades has allowed agencies
more discretion to use non-ALJs in place of ALJs.6 In contrast to
ALJs, non-ALJs almost never have statutory protections with
respect to their independence.7 Congress and policymakers have
concentrated on agencies' rulemaking powers and process,
providing little oversight or coordination over non-ALJs and their
hearings.8 Non-ALJs, if not confused with ALJs, have largely
worked in the shadows as the federal bureaucracy's "hidden
judiciary."9 But non-ALJs' independence is as important for
regulated parties and the agencies themselves as it was when
Congress enacted the APA with ALJs' protections. Impartial non-
ALJs are central to due process, fair proceedings with correct
decisions, and-perhaps most overlooked-faith in government and
administrative programs.10
Recognizing these problems, the Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS) commissioned this report to obtain data
and provide recommendations concerning non-ALJs' appointment,
independence, and oversight, especially as contrasted with ALJs'.
This report's two key purposes are (1) to build on prior projects
by reporting updated and more comprehensive data concerning non-
ALJs, and (2) to identify, based in part on these data, practices for
non-ALJ selection, oversight, and independence that promote non-
ALJs' actual and apparent impartiality. We recognize that agency
officials may have countervailing and disparate views as to our
recommendations, and that agencies have different statutory
6 See id. at 1662-66 (noting that courts under Chevron generally defer to an agencies'
statutory interpretation concerning whether an adjudication requires an ALJ).
7 See id. at 1649 (noting that AJs lack "ALJs' statutory protections from oversight and
removal").
8 See Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Judges and Agency Policy Development: The Koch
Way, 22 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 409 (2013) ("Administrative adjudication as a whole
gets much less attention in modern scholarship than rulemaking does.").
9 Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1341, 1345 (1992).
10 We use the terms impartial and independent interchangeably throughout. To be sure,
independence and impartiality are different concepts. But they are related. In the
adjudicatory context, independence generally refers to structural characteristics that
insulate an adjudicator from some authority or other parties. Independence is a means of
promoting an adjudicator's impartiality, i.e., her ability to issue fair, neutral decisions. See
James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1191, 1200 (2006). The key issue for agency adjudicators is what degree of independence
is necessary to promote or ensure their impartiality. See id. at 1213-15.
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charges and various factors to consider in administering their
agencies and adjudication systems. Accordingly, we offer
suggestions in the spirit of providing agencies alternative
approaches to establishing or reconsidering their adjudication
regimes and these regimes' effects on adjudicator impartiality.
In early 2017, we circulated a detailed survey to 64 federal
agencies and received responses from at least one subcomponent of
53 of those agencies, for a response rate of 83%.11 We asked the
responding agencies to provide information on a certain class of
hearings, if any, within their department or agency: those in which
a party could request an oral hearing to present evidence before an
agency official other than an AJ or agency head (Non-ALJ
Hearings).12
For agencies that reported offering Non-ALJ Hearings, we asked
the respondents two sets of questions. The first concerned the
different types of Non-ALJHearings that their agencies provide. For
instance, an agency may have enforcement proceedings under one
statute and benefits proceedings under another statute.13 The
second concerned the different types of non-ALJs as identified by
title and agency. For instance, an agency may have two types of non-
ALJs-"Administrative Judges" and "Hearing Officers"-who hear
the same or different kinds of matters.14 An agency received a set of
questions for each type of Non-ALJ Hearing and each type of non-
ALJs that it identified. Within these sets of questions, we requested
information on, among other things, the nature of the hearings, the
number of agency non-ALJs, their salaries and bonuses, hiring
qualifications, the nature of agency oversight and performance
appraisals, the propriety of ex parte contacts, and protection from
at-will removal.
Below is a summary of our key findings and alternative practices
for agencies to consider in reassessing their non-AL programs'
promotion of non-ALJ impartiality:
11 See infra app. B.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra app. A, Part B.




Types of Non-ALJ Hearings and Non-ALJs: Agencies reported 47
types of Non-AL Hearings and 37 types of non-ALJs.15
Nature of Non-ALJ Hearings: The 47 types of Non-ALJ Hearings
concern six subject-matter categories that we identified for the
respondents in the survey (such as enforcement, benefits, contracts,
etc.) and a number of miscellaneous subject matters.16 No subject
area comprised even 25% of the Non-ALJ Hearings.17 Agencies
reported that the agencies themselves are parties to the Non-ALJ
Hearings in 22 (47%) of the 47 types, and it is these hearings that
may present the most significant concerns over non-ALJ
independence and agency oversight."
Numbers and Titles of Non-ALJs: In contrast to the 1,931 ALJs
in the federal government, agencies reported at least 10,831 non-
ALJs.19 All but 39 of them are fulltime agency employees (although
some fulltime non-ALJs may have only part-time adjudicatory
duties).20 Of the 10,831 non-ALJs, 8,131 are Patent Examiners or
Appellate Patent Judges for the Department of Commerce.
21 The
agencies with the next largest groups of non-ALJs are Treasury
(714), Veterans Affairs (630), National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) (60022 ), and the Department of Justice's Executive Office
for Immigration Review (326).23 Non-ALJs reported in our survey
go by 23 different titles.24
Non-ALJ Salaries: We were able to calculate approximate base
salaries for 9,507 non-ALJs.25 More than 90% are paid under the
General Schedule (GS) pay scale.2 6 Excluding the 7,856 Patent
15 See infra app. C.
16 See infra Figure 14.
17 Id.
18 See infra Figure 15.
19 See infra Figure 1.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 The NLRB reported that it had "approximately" 600 non-ALJs, and we have used 600
for ease of calculation throughout.
23 Id.
2 See infra Figure 3.




Examiners, 57% (941) of the remaining 1,651 non-ALJs are paid in
compliance with the GS scale.27
Comparison of ALJ and Non-ALJ Salaries: In general, non-ALJs
have lower salaries than ALJs.28 Of all 9,507 non-ALJs for whom we
had calculable base-salary information, 5,415 or 57% are paid
within pay scales or grades that overlap with ALJs' (GS-14, GS-15,
and all applicable special pay scales).29 If we exclude Patent
Examiners and consider the remaining 1,651 non-AJs for whom
we have calculable base-salary information, 68% have base-salary
ranges that overlap with ALJs.30
Minimum Qualifications for Hiring Non-ALJs: Whether hiring
non-ALJs internally or externally, agencies' most common
minimum qualification is a law degree.31 When hiring externally,
agencies applied no other qualification to even half of the 37 non-
ALJ types for which agencies responded.32 When hiring internally,
agencies considered only subject-matter expertise and demeanor as
minimum qualifications for more than half of the non-ALJ types.33
Perhaps the most surprising findings were that agencies rely only
upon subject-matter expertise when hiring externally about 30% of
the time and that agencies rely more on references for internal hires
than they do for external hires.34
Separation of Functions: Sixteen (43%) non-ALJ types have no
separation of functions (i.e., they are not prohibited from performing
agency tasks other than adjudication or reporting to particular
agency personnel with nonadjudicatory functions).35 The remaining
non-ALJs have some kind of separation of functions. Some are fully
separated from other agency functions because the non-ALJs can
only adjudicate.36 Some have more limited separation. For instance,
some can perform functions that are not related to investigation or
prosecution (similar to ALJs), while other non-ALJs can perform
27 See infra Figure 5.
28 See infra Part V.A.3.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See infra Figures 19, 20 and accompanying text.
32 See infra Figure 19.
3 See infra Figure 20.
3 See infra Figures 19, 20 and accompanying text.
3 See infra Figure 21.
36 See infra Part V.D.1.
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agency functions subject to various other limitations.37 Other non-
ALJs have no need for separation of functions because their
agencies only adjudicate and thus have only one function.38 Non-
ALJs in 34 of the 37 types do not report directly to supervisors who
supervise investigations or prosecutions.39
Ex Parte Communications: Twenty-one (57%) non-ALJ types are
prohibited from having any ex parte communications, 11 (30%) are
partially limited, and five (14%) have no limitations.40 The most
common way of limiting ex parte communications is through
internal guidance or custom, relatively opaque mechanisms for
describing prohibitions and ensuring compliance.41
Physical Separation: A prominent scholar suggested decades ago
that adjudicators' physical separation from other agency personnel
was a relatively low-cost way of creating psychological distance
between them and ameliorating the adjudicators' sense of
separation. Agencies reported that 18 types of non-ALJs are
physically separated, 18 are not, and one is sometimes separated.4
2
Recusal: Thirty-one (84%) non-ALJ types must recuse
themselves if they cannot serve as unbiased adjudicators; the
remaining types are not required to recuse themselves.43
Performance Appraisals: Twenty-eight (76%) non-ALJ types and
99% of all non-ALJs by number are subject to performance
appraisals.44 These appraisals most commonly consider numerical
case-processing goals and various characteristics of the decisions
themselves (such as their reasoning or appropriate citations)
although many agencies design the review to ignore case
outcomes.45
Bonuses: Twenty (71%) non-ALJ types that are subject to
performance appraisals are eligible for bonuses, and 90% of all non-
ALJs by number are eligible for bonuses.46 The range of bonus-
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See infra Figure 24.
40 See infra Figure 25.
41 See infra Figure 26.
42 See infra Figure 27.
43 See infra Part V.D.4.
- See infra Figures 29, 30.
6 See infra Figure 31.
46 See infra Figures 32, 33.
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eligible non-ALJs who received bonuses in 2016 was from 7%
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)) to 100% (for
several non-ALJ types).47 Reported bonuses ranged from a few
hundred dollars to $36,000.48
Protection from At-Will Removal: Agencies reported that only
three non-ALJ types have protection from at-will removal (aside
from standard civil-service protections), two of which had
protections in collective-bargaining agreements and one of which
had statutory protection.4 9
B. KEY ALTERNATIVE PRACTICES
Hiring Process: Agencies might consider using advisory panels as
part of the non-ALJ hiring process (these panels are often called
"merit-selection panels" in the state and federal judicial context).
These advisory panels could be comprised of different constituencies
(including non-ALJs and agency officials) and consider transparent,
positive criteria when recommending candidates to hiring
authorities.
Separation of Functions and Space: To the extent possible,
agencies might provide non-ALJs separation of functions and
physical separation to provide actual and apparent independence
from other arms of the agency, especially when the agency is a party
to the proceedings.
Ex Parte Communications: Agencies might formally prohibit
non-ALJs from engaging in ex parte communications related to the
merits of a matter over which they are presiding. This suggested
prohibition, although slightly more stringent than the one for ALJs
under the APA,50 is consistent with the ACUS Model Adjudication
Rules and most agencies' reported practice.5 1 It is, however, slightly
more stringent than a recently adopted ACUS recommendation for
47 See infra Figure 34.
48 See infra Figure 35.
49 See infra Figure 38.
50 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d)(1) (2012) (noting the restrictions on ALJ ex parte
communications).
51 See MODEL ADJiUDICATION RULES § 120 (ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. 2018) (noting the
rules concerning ex parte communications).
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informal adjudicators that would permit certain internal agency ex
parte discussions with non-ALJs.5 2
Recusal Requirements: Most non-ALJ types must recuse when,
as stated in our questionnaire, they "cannot serve as ... unbiased
adjudicator [s]." 5 3 Agencies might memorialize recusal standards for
all non-ALJs.
Performance Appraisals and Bonuses: Agencies might
promulgate clear criteria, unrelated to case outcomes, for
performance appraisals and bonus payments.
Providing Clear Grounds for Adverse Actions: Agencies might
permit adverse actions, including removal, for non-ALJs only on
specified grounds that are unrelated to case outcomes.
Method of Agency Action: To further transparency, salience, and
efficacy, agencies might use notice-and-comment rulemaking when
promulgating provisions concerning non-ALJ independence. Agency
custom and internal guidance are often opaque and less concrete
than substantive rules.
II. NON-ALJ HEARINGS AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Adversarial hearings over which ALJs preside (ALJ Hearings)
are relatively uniform, and the APA protects AIJs as a class from
agency influence.54 The relative ease in describing and evaluating
ALJ Hearings may help explain why they receive the overwhelming
share of scholarly attention as to agency adjudication. Although
ALJ Hearings are central to the federal administrative state, Non-
ALJ Hearings exceed ALJ Hearings in number.65
52 See Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 40259, 40260 (Dec. 13, 2016).
53 See app. A (Q. 42). We did not specify a standard for recusal in our survey. Others have
noted the difficulty of "finding the appropriate, specific set of governing [ethical] rules" for
agency adjudicators. See, e.g., Moliterno, supra note 10, at 1194 (citing various state and
federal standards governing recusals and other ethical considerations for administrative
adjudicators); see also Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges:
Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 11
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7 (2002) (discussing the treatment of ethics for primarily state
administrative adjudicators). To limit the length and burden of our survey, we did not ask
agencies to identify their recusal standards.
54 Prominent examples of nonadversarial ALJ Hearings include certain welfare programs
(such as social security and Medicare).




Non-ALJ Hearings, unlike ALJ Hearings, vary greatly
throughout the administrative state,5 6 and this variety renders
describing and analyzing them a challenge. Moreover, non-ALJs as
a class do not have statutorily protected indicia of independence or
even uniform titles. Indeed, non-ALJs-if not simply confused with
ALJs57-are informally defined not by who they are but by whom
they are not. The lack of uniformity in non-ALJ proceedings may
explain why scholars and policymakers largely ignore them.
Although some agency non-ALJs have received considerable
attention in recent years (e.g., immigration judges), non-ALJs in the
aggregate are difficult to discuss in general terms and, given the
variety of non-ALJs and their evidentiary hearings, often difficult
even to identify.
As we discuss infra in Part II.C., only a few earlier studies have
reported cross-agency data on non-ALJs and their hearings. Two of
them surveyed numerous agencies to ascertain how many non-ALJs
existed within the federal government, how many agencies used
non-ALJs, and which federal pay grades applied to them.5 8 Those
surveys, however, were limited in scope and are more than 15 and
25 years old, respectively. A more recent ACUS-commissioned study
reported substantial data on the nature of certain Non-ALJ
66 See infra Figure 14.
57 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, no less, recently mistook non-ALJs for ALJs by
incorrectly indicating that an MSPB ALJ, instead of a non-ALJ, had presided over an
administrative adjudication at issue. Compare Perry v. MSPB, 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1982 (2017)
(stating that an Administrative Law Judge presided over the matter), with Perry v. Dep't of
Commerce, No. CD-0752-12-0486-B-1, 2014 WL 5358308, at *1-2 (M.S.P.B. 6, 2014)
(noting that an Administrative Judge presided over the matter). The MSPB uses ALJs for
matters concerning ALJs and non-ALJs (often called "Administrative Judges") for nearly all
other federal employees. See MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., ADVERSE ACTIONS: A COMPILATION
OF ARTICLES (A RPT. TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE U.S.) 55 (2016),
https://www.mspb.gov/mspbsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber-1361510&version=1366861&
application=ACROBAT ("Some types of cases are required, by statute, to use an ALJ. In other
cases, a regulation establishes the use of the ALJ because the agency issuing the regulation
exercised the discretion given to it by a statute to set forth the rule that an ALJ would be
used. Nearly all adverse action cases-whether taken under chapter 43 or 75 of title 5-are
heard by an AJ not an AL.").
58 See generally John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal
Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992); RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES,




Hearings and some data related to non-ALJ impartiality.5 9 But its
focus was not on the number of non-ALJs, the variety of the cases
that they decide, their hiring, their oversight, or their protection
from at-will removal.60
Our focus is on non-ALJs' impartiality. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that impartiality requirements under the Due Process
Clause apply to agency adjudication.6 1 Because actual bias would be
very difficult for litigating parties to prove, courts establish
prophylactic measures to promote judges' impartiality-and its
appearance-and to help ensure, as the Supreme Court said almost
100 years ago, that adjudicators "hold the balance nice, clear and
true."62 These measures often concern, among other things, the
adjudicator's appointment, relationship with the parties, and
financial interest in the proceeding.63 Even in the absence of
constitutional concerns, policymakers have incentives to consider
these prophylactic measures to promote adjudicators' impartiality.
After all, doing so protects the integrity of the adjudicating body and
its process-attributes that benefit the agency, as well as the
litigants.6 4
In this study, we:
(1) report our survey data on the number of non-ALJs,
the kinds of proceedings over which they preside,
qualifications for their appointment, and
characteristics concerning agency supervision and
oversight; and
5 See MICHAEL Asimow, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 3 (2016) (presenting data about federal administrative adjudication that
provide evidentiary hearings not governed by the APA).
60 Id.
61 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) ("As this Court repeatedly has
recognized, due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or
quasi-judicial capacities.").
62 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 878 (2009) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
6 See Barnett, supra note 5, 1672-77 (describing the various factors that tend to influence
an adjudicator's impartiality).
6 See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias,
2011 BYU L. REV. 943, 968 (highlighting the importance of public confidence in the perceived
impartiality and independence of the judiciary).
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(2) suggest various ways for agencies to promote non-
ALJs' appearance of impartiality by focusing on their
appointments and oversight.
Before describing our methodology in Part III, reporting our data
in Part IV, and providing our suggestions in Part V, we begin in this
Part by contrasting the two key types of agency evidentiary
hearings-ALJ Hearings and Non-AJ Hearings-and describing
the prior studies concerning non-ALJs and their hearings.
A. BASELINE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS
The drafters of the 1946 APA envisioned that the APA's uniform
provisions concerning so-called "formal" on-the-record adjudication
would apply to a wide variety of adjudicatory hearings required by
statute, even in the absence of the APA's specific triggering
language for such formal adjudicationS65 -"on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing."6 6 Formal on-the-record
adjudication provides numerous procedural protections under APA
sections 554, 556, and 557, which do not apply to so-called
"informal" adjudications. One of the most important protections for
regulated parties is that an independent ALJ must preside over
nearly all formal adjudications.6 7 AIA independence was a
purposeful and prominent response to widespread concerns before
the APA's enactment over unqualified and biased agency
adjudicators.68
The APA promotes ALJ independence in numerous ways. First,
ALJs are required by statute to be impartial.69 Second, ALJs cannot
65 S. REP. NO. 752, at 207 (1945), reprinted in S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at 268 (1947); see also DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, ATTY. GEN.'S MANUAL ON THE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT 41-43 (1947) (arguing that
formal adjudication has historically applied to nearly all hearings required by statute).
66 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
67 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012).
68 See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past
Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3-9, 43-45 (1997) ("[Tjhe critics' concerns
were addressed in the APA, which protected the factfinding of hearing examiners from agency
influence.").
69 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) ("The functions of presiding employees and of employees
participating in decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title shall be conducted in an
impartial manner.").
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perform duties inconsistent with their adjudicatory function,70 such
as investigating or prosecuting, or report to an official with these
duties.71 These provisions provide a separation of functions between
adjudication and prosecution within the agency. Third, ALJs can
engage in only limited ex parte communications.72 Fourth, paid
under an ALJ-specific pay scale, ALJs are exempt from performance
appraisals and cannot receive bonuses.73 Finally, agencies cannot
remove their ALJs except for "good cause established and
determined by" another independent agency, the Merit Systems
Protection Board.74
Until recently, an independent agency, the Office of Personnel
Management ("OPM"), oversaw agency hiring of ALJs under a
merit-based system. After administering an ALJ exam and rating
candidates, OPM provided a list of the three highest-scored
candidates for each ALJ vacancy from which the hiring agency had
to choose its ALJs.75 But after the publication of our underlying
report, President Trump issued an Executive Order altering ALJ
hiring.76 Under the EO and forthcoming OPM regulations and
policies, department heads will directly appoint their ALJs with
little to no OPM involvement. Instead of being hired under a merit-
70 Id. § 3105 (stating that ALJs "may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and
responsibilities as administrative law judges").
71 Id. § 554(d)(2) (2012).
72 Id.; id. § 557(d)(1) (2012).
73 See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1655-56. This is not to say that reviewing judges'
performance necessarily interferes with their independence; the key determinants are how
the review is structured and the criteria on which it is based. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The
Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance
Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589, 603-07 (1993-94) (suggesting ALJs'
performance should be subject to peer review led by Chief ALJs). In fact, a majority of state-
court judges who undergo performance evaluations by law regularly report that such
assessments do not impact their independence and can even enhance it. See, e.g., KEVIN M.
ESTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR
STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 43-44 (American Judicature Society, 1998)
(noting that judges in the four states surveyed generally felt that the evaluations preserved
their independence); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., THE BENCH
SPEAKS ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: A SURVEY OF COLORADO JUDGES i (2008)
(noting that more than two-thirds of Colorado trial and appellate judges said evaluations
either increased independence or did not impact it).
74 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
75 See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 804-05 (2013)
("Agencies, under what is known as the 'Rule of Three,' may then select from the three
highest-ranking candidates.").
76 Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 10, 2018).
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based system with rankings, ALJs will be part of the excepted
service, which means that the agencies themselves can determine
the hiring qualifications, save that the ALJs must have a law
license. The OPM director has agreed to implement the Executive
Order.77
As of March 2017, OPM reported 1,931 ALJs.78 They are
employed by 27 agencies.79 Of these 1,931 ALJs, the Social Security
Administration (SSA) employs 1,655.80 The agencies with the next
highest numbers of ALJs are the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) with 101, the Department of Labor with 41, and the
NLRB with 34.81 Twenty of the 27 agencies employ fewer than 10
ALJs.82
Until the early 2000s, OPM operated an Office of Administrative
Law Judges to assist with the hiring of ALJs and related matters.83
Along with the uniformity of ALJ characteristics and their
proceedings, the presence of that office led numerous scholars and
policymakers to collect information on ALJs and analyze formal
adjudication in depth. Accordingly, formal adjudication and ALJs
are often the only form of agency adjudication and agency
adjudicators that receive sustained attention in administrative-law
courses. This limited focus on ALJs in the law-school curriculum
typically leaves only ALJs with a place in academic and policy-
making discourse.
B. NON-ALJ HEARINGS
The focus on ALJs and APA formal adjudication obscures
agencies' increased use of non-ALJs for evidentiary hearings that
do not qualify as formal adjudication under the APA. After the
7 Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, OPM (July 10, 2018)
(on file with author).
78 OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: ALJS BY AGENCY, (Mar. 2017),
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency





83 See John T. Miller, Jr., Some Reflections on OPM's Administration of Its APA AIA
Functions, 30 WTR ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 6 (2005) (discussing current potential directions
after the dismantling of the Office of Administrative Law Judges).
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Supreme Court's well-known Chevron decision,84 courts granted
agencies broad discretion to interpret statutes that did not
expressly call for on-the-record hearings (the trigger for ALJ
Hearings under the APA) as permitting Non-ALJ Hearings.85 The
APA only minimally governs these Non-ALJ Hearings (often
referred to as "informal adjudications") and provides almost no
required procedures.86 That said, due to statute or agency-created
procedures, Non-ALJ Hearings are often similar in formality and
procedure to formal adjudication under the APA.
87
Despite the numerous procedural similarities between Non-ALJ
Hearings and ALJ Hearings, Non-ALJ Hearings are meaningfully
different from ALJ Hearings in one key respect: non-ALJs preside
over them. Except for extremely rare exceptions, non-ALJs, who go
by different titles at different agencies, do not share ALJs' statutory
protections as to their independence.88 Not only do Non-ALJ
Hearings differ across the federal administrative state, but the non-
ALJs' characteristics are similarly disparate.
The lack of uniformity can be problematic for scholars and
policymakers. The absence of uniform hearing procedures and
uniform protections for non-ALJs leads to balkanized agency
proceedings for which data collection across agencies proves
difficult. Without cross-agency information, it is difficult to have
useful discussions as to the hearings or the adjudicators. Aside from
84 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5 See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(upholding the EPA's interpretation of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
which allowed for holding informal hearings); Dominion Energy Brayton Point v. Johnson,
LLC, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2006) (upholding an EPA regulation that eliminated evidentiary
hearings during the process to obtain certain permits); see also ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT
OF ADJUDICATORS IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 23-24 (2014),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents[FINAL%20EEOC%20Final%
2 Report%2
0%5B3-31-14%5D.pdf ("Agencies administering statutes that require 'hearings' or 'public
hearings' but not 'hearings on the record' have been accorded Chevron deference when
interpreting these terms to allow informal adjudication.").
86 See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012) (applying only to "Ancillary Matters"); 5 U.S.C. § 558 (2012)
(applying to certain licensing and sanctioning actions).
87 See 2 PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT FOR
RECOMMENDATION 92-7: THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1053-54 (1992)
(discussing the formality of Non-ALJ Hearings;); ASIMOW, supra note 59, at 2 (discussing
various types of adjudication not dictated by the APA).
88 See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1656-62 (discussing a range of differences between ALJs
and non-ALJs); id. at 1648 n.21 (discussing protections given to some AJs).
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certain exceptions (such as immigration judges), non-ALJs have
become the "hidden judiciary,"89 largely neglected by policymakers
despite their vital function within the federal administrative state.
C. PRIOR STUDIES CONCERNING NON-ALJS
Three comprehensive empirical projects have attempted to
provide some cross-agency insight into non-ALJs, non-ALJ
Hearings, or both.90 Here, we provide a brief overview of each
survey. We refer to relevant findings in the discussion of our
findings and suggestions.
1. The Frye Study
The first study was a 1989 ACUS-sponsored survey that
culminated in a law-review article in 1992 by ALJ (and former non-
AM) John Frye ("the Frye Study").91 The survey asked twelve
questions of agencies that "administer [ed] one or more programs
that offer the opportunity for an oral hearing presided over by an
official who is not an [ALJ] ,"92 even if most matters were handled
through written submissions.93 Frye, with ACUS's assistance, sent
the survey to 48 agencies and received responses from 47.94 Of those
47 agencies, 34 responded that they held hearings that were
described in the questionnaire.9 5
Frye reported 2,692 non-ALJs, who were associated with 83
separate case types.96 Approximately 2,200-including about 1,700
who worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs-were within
paygrades GS-9 through 15.97 Approximately 175 non-ALJs were
"supergrades" (that is, paid on the general service scale above GS-
8 Id. at 1645 (quoting Chris Guthrie et al., The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1478 (2009)).
9 There are a handful of case studies, too. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal
Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 757-779 (1976) (considering whether
informal adjudications within four federal agencies met due process requirements).
91 See generally Frye, supra note 58.
92 Id. app. A, at 348.
9 See id. at 267 n.9 ("[I]n some of the case types reported, the bulk of the proceedings were
decided on the basis of written submissions.").
9 Id. app. A, at 347.
9 Id.




15), senior-executive service (SES) officials, or military officers.98
Only eight of these higher paid non-ALJs had other duties. 99 Frye
also reported that 237 non-ALJs were part-time agency officials or
did not work for the government.1 0 0 For instance, insurance carriers,
not the federal government, employed HHS hearing officers for
certain medical-insurance claims.10 1 Of all the non-ALJs, only 601
had no other duties, and 438 were lawyers.102
Frye spent most of his lengthy report discussing the different
kinds of cases for which agencies used non-ALJs (enforcement,
benefits, etc.), the number of cases for.each type, and the due process
implications of the reported hearings.103 He also reported some
findings concerning the nature of non-ALJs. He primarily divided
the non-ALJs into two groups: those who only presided over
hearings and those who had additional duties from their respective
agencies.1 0 4 He argued that the former group were likely to be more
efficient in managing their dockets (especially with higher
caseloads) and appeared more independent from the agency itself.105
Within both groups, he reported information related to agency
oversight and non-ALJ independence, such as the use of
performance appraisals and formal and informal review of non-ALJ
decisions.106 Although he asked questions concerning non-ALJ
hiring, "most agencies did not provide any information on the
qualifications that they deem important."10
7
2. 1992 ACUS Report
The Frye Study served as a critical source for a comprehensive
1992 ACUS study by Paul Verkuil, Daniel Gifford, Charles Koch,
9s Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. app. B at 352.
101 Id. app. B at 351.
102 Id. app. B at 349.
103 See generally Frye, supra note 58.
104 See id. at 269-74 (devoting an entire section to "Presiding Officers without Other
Duties").
105 See id. at 270-71 ("[Tlhere is more concern with quality control and efficiency, and
consequently less independence, where presiding officers have other duties.").
10 See id. at 269-74 ("Appeals by parties, performance appraisal, and informal review are
all used to a greater extent in terms of both case types and caseload where presiding officers
are assigned other duties.").
107 Id. at 272.
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Richard Pierce, and Jeffrey Lubbers. Their report considered both
ALJ Hearings and Non-ALJ Hearings.108 They relied upon the Frye
Study and additional research to provide, among other things,
information on the ALJ- and non-ALJ- selection processes, their
independence, a thorough history of administrative adjudication,
and a survey of adjudicators' attitudes. They recommended
converting certain Non-ALJ Hearings to ALJ Hearings.109 Their
report led to ACUS Recommendation 92-7, which called for non-
ALJs who oversee certain significant matters (including those with
substantial economic effects or limitations on personal liberty) to
have "standards for independence, selection, experience, and
compensation that approximate those accorded to ALJs." 10
3. The Limon Study
In 2002, Raymond Limon, a former Executive Director of OPM's
now-defunct Office of Administrative Law Judges, recognized that
"there is no systematic or centralized method to track non-ALJ
workforce information" and sought to update Frye's data ("the
Limon Study").111 Similar to the Frye Study, the Limon Study asked
whether agencies "provide[d] an opportunity for an 'oral hearing'
conducted by an agency official who is not an [ALJ]."112 The 10
questions that Limon posed were similar to those in the Frye Study,
although they concentrated more on non-ALJs and less on their
hearings and caseloads. For instance, the Limon Study asked about
the number of non-ALJs, their titles, their pay grades and
occupation series, their minimum qualifications, and their
performance appraisals and protection from agency bias.113
Limon sent his survey to more agencies than did Frye-80 to
Frye's 48. He also received more responses (65 to Frye's 47),
although a similar number of agencies (36 for Limon and 35 for
Frye) reported having relevant Non-ALJ Hearings.1 14
108 See generally VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 87. ,
10o See id. at 1058 ("[A]dministrative judges should not be employed in lieu of ALJs simply
to avoid bureaucratic impediments to ALJ selection.").
110 Id. at 12 (1992).
i LIMON, supra note 58, at 2.
112 Id. app. B at "2002 Survey Questions of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs.".
113 Id.
114 Barnett, supra note 5, at 1657-58 nn.90-91.
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The Limon Study reported key differences between Frye's and its
data, but the Limon Study mostly presented its data in spreadsheet
format for others to analyze.115 Most germane to this report, the
Limon Study found that the number of reported non-ALJs had
increased from approximately 2,700 to 3,370, with the Department
of Commerce replacing Veterans Affairs as having the most non-
ALJs (approximately 1,100).116 Approximately 83% of the non-ALJs
received performance appraisals.117
4. The Asimow Study
Professor Michael Asimow prepared a 2016 report, Evidentiary
Hearings Outside the Administrative Procedure Act, for ACUS ("the
Asimow Study"). The adjudications at issue were similar, but not
identical, to those in the Frye and Limon Studies. Recall that Frye
and Limon broadly considered instances in which the agencies
provided oral hearings over which non-ALJs presided. Asimow, in
contrast, studied what he refers to as "Type B" adjudications. In
brief, Asimow contrasts Type B adjudications with Type A
adjudications (ALJ Hearings under the APA), and Type C
adjudications (those adjudications that occur without any
evidentiary hearing required by law).118 Type B adjudications, in
comparison, are oral or written hearings required by law over which
non-ALJs preside.119 The formal-adjudication provisions of the APA
do not apply, and the parties' evidence and argument, along with
officially noticed matters, serve as the exclusive record for decision.
Type B hearings do not include public hearings, conferences that do
not become part of the exclusive record, "front-line" initial decisions
that precede evidentiary hearings, or review that does not permit
the submission of new evidence.120 Thus, Asimow's selected category
of hearings is broader than Frye's and Limon's because it includes
oral and written hearings. But it is narrower because it includes
ns5 LIMON, supra note 58, at 2 ("[W]e wanted to limit our involvement to 'data collection'
and allow for other interested parties to draw their own conclusions or findings.").
116 Id. at 3.
117 Id. at 4.
us See ASIMOW, supra note 59, at 2.
n1 See id. ("The term 'Type B" refers to systems of adjudication administered by federal
agencies through evidentiary hearings required by statute, regulation, or executive orders,
that are not governed by ... the APA.").
120 Id. at 11.
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hearings that require an exclusive record and excludes certain
hearings or adjudications that Frye and Limon may have included.
The Asimow Study focused on the procedures in ten selected
subject-matter adjudications over which non-ALJs preside and
recommended best practices,121 which ACUS largely adopted.122 It
also provided some limited information on the number of non-ALJs
and their caseloads.123 And it reported data on the integrity of the
ten adjudication areas, such as whether agencies have provisions or
guidance on bias, ex parte communications, and separation of
functions.124 In addition to reporting his findings on these particular
adjudications, Asimow, working with ACUS and Stanford Law
School, established a comprehensive database to collect and
confirm, on an ongoing basis, data on all forms of federal
administrative adjudication.125 The data that Asimow has collected
for the database overlap with some of the data that we collect here,
including: representation of private parties and agencies, discovery,
subpoena authority, ex parte communications, types of hearings
and appeals, cross examination, caseload statistics, and information
about adjudicators.
III. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF PROJECT
Although taking inspiration from these earlier studies, our study
has different purposes, a broader scope, and a slightly different
survey design.
A. PURPOSE
First, we seek to update Frye's and Limon's data on non-ALJs'
numbers, status, and case types throughout the federal
administrative state. More specifically, we provide updated data on
non-ALJ pay grades, titles, and employment statuses.
Second, we provide more comprehensive data than the previous
studies provided on indicia of non-ALJs' independence. These
121 Id. at 1.
122 See Recommendation 2016-4, supra note 52.
123 ASIMOW, supra note 59, at 16 tbl.2.
124 Id. at 35 tbl.3.
125 See generally ADMIN. CONF. OFTHEU.S. & STANFORD L. SCH., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATiVE
ADJUDICATION, https://acus.law.stanford.edul ( ast visited Feb. 3, 2018).
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indicia include: qualifications for their selection, whether they are
hired from outside or from within the agency, their physical
separation from others in the agency, any limitations on their
duties, whether they receive performance appraisals from their
agencies, whether they are eligible for bonuses, whether they must
recuse themselves if they cannot serve as unbiased adjudicators,
and whether they have any protection from at-will removal. (After
consultation with ACUS staff, we determined that questions
concerning the mechanisms for non-ALJ selection would require
narrative answers that would render comparisons difficult.)
Third, we provide suggestions for protecting non-ALJ
independence. We comment on non-ALJ selection, protection from
undue agency influence during proceedings, and protection from
undue agency oversight. Unlike prior projects or academic
literature, our purpose is not to recommend when agencies or
Congress should use ALJs or non-ALJs,126 or to suggest particular
procedures for evidentiary hearings, save those that concern non-
ALJ independence.12 7
B. SCOPE
Despite the earlier studies' substantial influence on our project,
our project has a unique focus that does not track theirs. We focus
on the non-ALJs themselves and only on the aspects of their
hearings that most directly implicate non-ALJs' independence.
Relatedly, although our study updates much of the data from the
Frye and Limon Studies, our survey is substantially broader with
more targeted questions concerning matters related to non-ALJs'
independence. The use of more particularized questions provides
more consistent answers from the responding agencies and permits
better comparisons across agencies.
126 See, e.g., VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 87, at 1058 (recommending that Congress should
expand the use of ALJs to "preserve the uniformity of process and decider qualifications
contemplated by the APA"); Barnett, supra note 5, at 1643 (arguing that agencies should
choose ALJs over AJs to further their own interests).
127 ACUS has charged a working group with revising the Model Adjudication Rules
("MARs"). The MARs are intended to serve as model rules for agencies' adversarial,




Because of the variety of agency adjudications, it is difficult to
identify and define in a survey instrument the various terms related
to Non-ALJ Hearings. Moreover, the inclusion of too many
definitions or complicated, nuanced definitions can dissuade
agencies from completing the survey. Thus, we provided as
descriptive a definition as we thought prudent to capture the kinds
of Non-ALJ Hearings that we sought to consider (referred to as "oral
hearings" in the survey itself):
One of the parties to the adjudication can-by statute,
regulation, or other law-obtain an oral hearing over
which an agency official presides to present evidence,
even if most matters are handled through written
submissions without an oral hearing,
and
the presiding agency official is not a member or
commissioner of the agency, and is not an
"Administrative Law Judge." Instead, the agency
official goes by another title, such as Administrative
Judge, Administrative Appeals Judge, Administrative
Patent Judge, Board of Contract Appeals Judge,
Veterans Law Judge, Immigration Judge, Presiding
Officer, Hearing Officer, etc.
The relevant "oral hearings" do not include "public
hearings" in which members of the public are invited to
make statements or an initial "front-line" agency
decision when that initial decision is followed by an
evidentiary hearing before an agency or court.128
By considering only instances in which a party can obtain an oral
hearing (even if parties rarely do so), we largely tracked Frye's and
Limon's definition. But, like Asimow (and unlike Frye and Limon),
we limited our evidentiary hearings to those in which a party had a
right to such a hearing, whether through a statute or regulation.
Notably, our definition does not include those hearings for which a
party cannot seek an oral (as opposed to a written) hearing, and
thus our definition is narrower than Asimow's definition of "Type B"
128 See infra app. A at Part A.
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hearings. Despite our interest in these "written" hearings that
Asimow included, we were concerned that responding agencies may
confuse those hearings with what Asimow refers to as "Type C"
adjudications. Similar to all of these studies, the hearings that we
considered did not distinguish hearings concerning facts, law, and
agency discretion.129
In an effort to capture all Non-ALJ Hearings, we also did not
include Asimow's exclusive-record limitation.130 The APA requires
an exclusive record only for ALJ Hearings.13 1 Because our focus was
primarily on the adjudicators, as opposed to the process of the
hearing, we wanted to ensure that we obtained all of the uses of non-
ALJs within federal agencies. That said, except as otherwise
indicated, we are not aware of any hearings that the agencies
identified that lack an exclusive-record limitation, and thus future
surveys may consider including the exclusive-record limitation.132
Like Asimow, however, we excluded "public hearings," meaning
those to which the public may provide statements.133 We also
excluded "front-line" determinations, meaning initial decisions that
are followed by evidentiary hearings. Finally, we excluded hearings
over which the agency heads presided because it is likely that
different due process considerations apply to those adjudications.134
That said, although our definition targets trial-like adjudicators
who preside at evidentiary hearings, we did not exclude
administrative appellate processes over which non-ALJs preside
because they were included in the Frye and Limon Studies.135 In
addition, it is not clear whether evidentiary matters are never
permitted in those appellate proceedings. We do, however,
segregate appellate proceedings from initial hearings, where
129 See, e.g., AsiMow, supra note 59, at 7-9 (distinguishing Type B adjudication from Types
A and C adjudication).
130 Id. at 4 (noting that the "exclusive record principle means that the decisionmaker is
confined to considering inputs from the parties").
131 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012) ("The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all
papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitute the exclusive record . . . .").
132 Because our definition is not identical to Asimow's, we refer to our reported hearings as
Non-ALJ Hearings, not "Type B" hearings.
1as ASIMOW, supra note 59, at 10.
I See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1679-80 (noting several distinctions between agency heads
and AJs).
135 Frye, supra note 58, at 263; LIMON, supra note 58, at 2.
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indicated. Otherwise, our findings and suggestions apply to trial
and appellate non-ALJs alike.
C. SURVEY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
In this quantitative study, we administered a survey, attached
as Appendix A, to numerous federal agencies, identified in Appendix
B. With the assistance of ACUS's research attorneys, we compiled a
list of agencies that responded to earlier surveys or that we
anticipated may have had responsive oral hearings. In February
2017, we then circulated the surveys to ACUS's contacts at 64
agencies or subcomponents within agencies, along with the
agencies' responses (if any) to the Limon Study to help ensure that
the agency did not overlook responsive non-ALJs and Non-ALJ
Hearings. We asked the ACUS contacts to circulate the survey to
those within their agencies and offices who had knowledge of
adjudication programs. Although we asked them to contact us if
they had questions as to which "oral hearings" were responsive or
the meaning of certain questions, only a handful of agencies did so.
Our survey sought information on different types of Non-ALJ
Hearings and non-ALJs themselves. We asked responding agencies
(or their subcomponents) first to identify themselves and then to
report whether they had any "oral hearings" as defined in Part II.B.
If they answered no, the survey ended. If they responded yes, the
survey proceeded with two batteries of questions. One battery
concerned types of Non-ALJ Hearings, and the other concerned
types of non-ALJs. In contrast to the approximately 12 questions
that the Frye and Limon Studies posed to agencies, each agency
with responsive "oral hearings" would have received as many as 13
questions for the battery on hearings and 28 questions for the
battery on non-ALJs, depending on their answers and any related
follow-up questions.136 Agencies received one battery for each type
of Non-ALJ Hearing and one battery for each type of non-ALJ. If
agencies had more than one type of Non-ALJ Hearing or one type of
non-ALJ, they would have received many more total questions.
The battery of questions concerning the types of Non-ALJ
Hearings dealt with, among other things: the title of the presiding
non-ALJs, the number who preside over those hearings, whether
136 Frye, supra note 58, at 261; LIMON, supra note 58, at app. C.
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they are full- or part-time, whether the agency borrows non-ALJs
from other agencies, whether the non-ALJs' employing agency is
party to the proceeding, whether the non-ALJs can issue final
orders, whether the agency offers an internal appellate process, and
whether the agency applies any quantitative case-processing oals
as to those Non-ALJ Hearings.
The battery of questions for the types of non-ALJs considered,
among other things: their titles, their number, their pay grades and
occupational series, the agency's hiring criteria for selecting non-
ALJs from within and outside the agency, whether the agency
prohibits ex parte communications, whether the agency imposes
any separation of functions, whether and how the agency conducts
performance appraisals, whether the non-ALJs are eligible for
bonuses, whether they are required to recuse themselves if they
cannot serve as unbiased adjudicators, and whether they are
protected from at-will removal.137
We received responses on a rolling basis between February and
May 2017. Because some agencies have more than one office with
adjudicatory programs, one agency or department may have
provided more than one response. If we received more than one
response for the same adjudicatory program within the agency, we
selected the more complete survey or combined answers to different
questions to provide a more comprehensive response. After
receiving answers from the agencies, we reviewed the answers for
any meaningful inconsistencies. We then contacted the agency
official who responded to the survey to resolve them.
Our further communications with agency contacts asking them
to complete the survey led to a higher, but not close to a 100%,
response rate. Our large number of responses from a diverse
number of agencies provides some basis for generalizing our
137 Our survey presented the questions with "skip logic," meaning that an agency's response
to one question could lead to follow up questions depending on how they answered the
predicate question. Because our questions routinely relied upon preceding questions for
context, we presented our questions in a fixed order. Accordingly, our survey did not take
steps to minimize response-order effects. See, e.g., Jon A. Krosnick & Duane F. Alwin, An
Evaluation of a Cognitive Theory of Response-Order Effects in Survey Measurement, 51 PuB.
Op. Q. 201 (1987) (explaining that "the order in response alternatives are presented to
respondents may have a significant influence upon their selections").
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findings.138 But we err conservatively here and present our findings
descriptively. Relatedly, we do not claim to have captured all non-
ALJs and Non-ALJ Hearings in our study.139 Instead, we are
reporting our significant findings only as to those non-ALJs and
Non-ALJ Hearings that agencies identified in response to our
survey.
As with all surveys, one must be careful in assessing the
agencies' reported data. Responding officials can engage in social-
desirability bias-that is, attempting to demonstrate (either to
themselves or to others) more familiarity with the surveyed issues
than they possess.140 Moreover, because we did not permit
anonymous responses, this bias may be more meaningful because
the officials may seek to present their agency in a more positive light
or, alternatively, to highlight what they perceive as flaws within the
agency.
Relatedly, we report the data as the agencies responded. We have
not independently confirmed the data provided (except as discussed
below), and thus the agencies may have reported incorrect data.
Many agencies failed to answer every question posed. Their failure
to do so limits our response rate for particular questions. That said,
when an agency's later answers permitted us to answer an earlier
question confidently to which the agency did not respond, we
marked a response to that question for the agency so as to obtain
more complete responses.141 We indicate in the description of our
findings the number of responses to the particular question.
1as See FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 9-11 (5th ed. 2014) (describing
the sampling flaws that cause characteristics of the sample to not reflect the population's
characteristics).
139 For instance, the Small Business Administration did not respond to our survey, but it
has an Office of Hearings and Appeals. U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN. WEBSITE, OFFICE OF
HEARINGS & APPEALS, https://www.sba.gov/oha (last visited Nov. 3, 2018).
140 See Harold A. Sackeim & Ruben C. Gur, Self-Deception, Self-Confrontation, and
Consciousness, in 2 CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-REGULATION: ADVANCES IN THEORY 139, 142-
50 (Gary E. Schwartz & David Shapiro eds., 1978) (defining and considering the role of self-
deception in fields of research).
141 For purposes of certain analysis, we added two variables-the nature of the non-ALJs'
hearings and whether the hearings might be limited only to administrative appellate
proceedings in which no new evidence would be received-after all agencies had responded.
We coded these variables based on the agencies' similar response to other questions. The
variable concerning the nature of the non-ALJs' hearings aided our ability to cross-tabulate
our reported data using IBM SPSS statistics software.
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Finally, at times, an agency's answers were inconsistent or
obviously mistaken. Based on more specific answers or easily
confirmed facts, we report what we perceived to be the correct
answer. Of course, these revisions to the reported data required
judgment. Fortunately, these revisions were few, and errors in those
judgments, if any, would not meaningfully affect our reported
results. And as mentioned earlier, for meaningful questions or
inconsistencies, we contacted the agencies for clarification, which
we used to revise their reported answers.
IV. DATASET
Even with these limitations, we have a robust dataset hat yields
numerous interesting findings.
We sent a detailed survey to 64 federal departments, agencies, or
subcomponents within them.142 We received 61 responses from 53
federal entities,143 whether identified as an "agency" or at least one
subcomponent within a larger entity.144 One agency, accordingly,
may have had more than one subcomponent respond. Responses
from 53 of the 64 federal entities to which we sent surveys means
that 83% of the entities provided at least one response. While 31
agencies or their subcomponents reported they do not conduct Non-
ALJ Hearings, the analyses that follow are based on responses from
30 agencies or their subcomponents that conduct Non-ALJ
Hearings. Notably, we had slightly fewer agencies respond that they
had responsive hearings than for either the Limon Study or the Frye
Study.145 For ease of reference, we refer to all responding entities as
"agencies."
142 For comparison's sake, Limon surveyed 80 agencies and Frye surveyed 48 agencies. See
LIMON, supra note 58, at 2; Frye, supra note 58, at app. A.
143 A list of the surveyed agencies and the nature of their responses, if any, are attached as
Appendix B.
144 65 agencies responded to the Limon Study and 47 responded to the Frye Study. Compare
LIMON, supra note 58, at app. C, with Frye, supra note 58, app. A.
146 36 agencies responded that they had relevant non-ALJ hearings for the Limon Study,
and 35 did so for the Frye Study. Compare LIMON, supra note 58, at app. C, with Frye, supra
note 58, app. A.
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Agencies reported having 47 types of Non-ALJ Hearings, 15 of
which may consist of only appellate Non-ALJ Hearings.146 They also
reported 37 types of non-ALJs.147
V. SURVEY DATA
We present our findings in the following order: (1) the types,
number, titles, and salaries of non-ALJs; (2) the types of Non-ALJ
Hearings over which they preside; (3) minimum qualifications for
non-ALJs' selection; and (4) agencies' oversight of non-ALJs and,
relatedly, non-ALJs' independence. We do not rely on all of the
reported findings below in our recommendations to agencies-
especially many of those in subsection A-because issues
surrounding the number and pay for non-ALJs would require
legislative intervention. Other findings, including many of those in
subsection B, help inform later analyses and recommendations,
even if they play only a secondary role. But we report the data here
because they offer a more descriptive picture of non-ALJs and how
agencies use them than simply reporting non-ALJs' indicia of
independence from their agencies. They may also aid future
research or recommendations.
A. TYPES OF NON-ALJS
Agencies reported 37 total types of non-ALJs, meaning that one
responding agency may have more than one kind of non-ALJ. For
instance, the IRS reported two types of non-ALJs: Settlement
Officers and Appeals Officers. If a different agency also employed
non-ALJs titled Settlement Officers or Appeals Officers, we would
recognize them as additional types. The characteristics of different
non-ALJs within the same agency often vary, and we have
attempted to capture their diverse features. In this subsection, we
consider non-ALJs' numbers, titles, and salaries.
146 Appendix B provides a list of the surveyed agencies and the nature of their responses, if
any.
147 Appendix C lists the reported types of hearings and types of non-ALJs for each
responding agency.
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1. Number of Non-ALJs
Agencies reported, as indicated in Figure 1, at least 10,831 non-
ALJs.148 Of course, these numbers are fluid; an agency may have
hired more non-ALJs or declined to fill later vacancies after
answering the survey. All but 39 of these non-ALJs are fulltime
agency employees, although some fulltime employees have other
duties in addition to presiding over adjudications. Of these 10,831
non-ALJs, 8,131 (75%) work for the Department of Commerce-
7,856 as Patent Examiners for the Patent and Trademark Office
and 275 as Appellate Patent Judges with the Patent and Trademark
Appeal Board (including ten part-time judges and seven judges with
administrative responsibilities). Accordingly, the remaining 2,700
non-ALJs work for other agencies.
148 We calculated this number based on the number of non-ALJs for which agencies
reported salary grades (9,594) and additional non-ALJs whom agencies reported when
responding to other questions. The Peace Corps did not provide any salary information on its
6 non-ALJs, the VA on its 630 reported non-ALJs, the Administrative Office of the Courts on
its part-time non-AU, and the NLRB on its 600 reported non-ALJs. We added these non-
ALJs to our count.
When agencies reported part-time information and salary information on their non-ALJs, we
have assumed that these part-time employees were included in the reported salary-related
numbers. Other agencies reported hiring non-ALJs on a contract basis (Treasury's Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau for labor arbitrations and FDIC for miscellaneous
proceedings). We have not included these contract non-ALJs in our totals.
When agencies reported different numbers of non-ALJs in response to different questions, we
used the response to salary-related information because it was more specific. For instance,
PTO reported 8,300 Patent Examiners but provided salary data on only 7,856 of them.
Relatedly, EEOC reported 110 Administrative Judges in response to one question but salary
data on only 92 of them. CFTC reported one non-ALJ in response to one question but reported
15 non-ALJs when answering salary-related questions. Treasury reported 449 Appeals
Officers but provided salary information on 457 of them. DOJ/EOIR reported 300 non-ALJs
at one point, but provided salary information on 326 of them. MSPB reported 64 non-ALJs
for one question and 70 in salary-related answers.
NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS
Figure 1 - Number of Reported Non-ALJs
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The number of reported non-ALJs has increased substantially-
by approximately 183%-since the 2002 Limon Study. Most
notably, the number of Patent Examiners has increased from 1,000
14 One non-ALJ is appointed as necessary.
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to more than 7,800.150 Although we were initially skeptical of this
substantial increase, PTO had announced its goal of hiring
thousands more Patent Examiners shortly after the Limon Study 51
and has reported an increase of more than 50% in its employee
numbers over less than a decade in 2014.152 The reported number in
the Limon Study and our survey, if anything, are likely both
substantially lower than the numbers that PTO uses for its annual
reports. For instance, for fiscal year 2002 (the same year as Limon's
Study), PTO reported 3,538 Patent Examiners,153 compared to the
1,000 reported to Limon.154 And in fiscal year 2016, PTO reported
more than 8,300 Patent Examiners, as compared to the 7,856
reported in our survey.155
Only 39 of the 10,831 non-ALJs, as Figure 1 indicates, are part-
time agency employees. The NRC had the largest number of part-
time non-ALJs with 19, followed by the PTO with 10, the EEOC
with five, and a few other agencies having smaller numbers. A few
agencies-such as the FDIC and the Treasury's Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax and Trade Bureau-reported using non-ALJs but so rarely that
they merely hired contract non-ALJs as necessary.
A total of 2,700 non-ALJs work for agencies other than the
Department of Commerce. Ten agencies each employ more than 25
non-ALJs, as indicated in Figure 2: Treasury (714), VA (630), NLRB
(600), DOJ (326), EEOC (92), MSPB (70, including two part-time
Chief AJs), SSA (61), GAO (45), FLRA (40), and NRC (30). Together,
these ten agencies employ 2,608 of the 2,700 non-ALJs who do not
work for Commerce. The remaining 92 of the 2,700 non-ALJs work
for other agencies.
Of these agencies with more than 25 non-ALJs and Commerce,
six were also included in the Limon Study's top-ten list of non-ALJs
by agency. Those on both lists include Commerce, Treasury,
150 Limon, supra note 58, app. C at 1.
151 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 2003 2
(stating that it hoped to add almost 3,000 additional Patent Examiners over the next five
years).
152 Dennis Crouch, USPTO's Swelling Examiner Rolls, PATENTLYO (Nov. 30, 2014)
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/11/usptos-swelling-examiner.html.
163 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 2002 9.
15 LIMON, supra note 58, app. C at 1.
155 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 2016
16. This number was greater than 9,161 the year before. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 2015 14.
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Veterans Affairs, DOJ, EEOC, and MSPB. 156 SSA reported only 25
non-ALJs in the Limon Study and more than doubled its numbers
in our survey.157 Notably, the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA) reported for the Limon Study that it used only ALJs,15 8 but
reported using 40 fulltime non-ALJs in our study, providing an
example of the well-known trend of agencies moving towards using
non-ALJs. Differences between the reported numbers in the Limon
Study and ours largely arise because some agencies or their
subcomponents responded to one but not the other.159
Figure 2 - Agencies Reporting >25 Non-ALJs, excl. Commerce
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For comparative purposes, OPM reports that 1,931 ALJs work
for 27 agencies,160 while our survey indicates that 10,831 non-ALJs
work for 27 agencies. Just as more than 85% of ALJs work for one
agency (SSA), 161 more than 79% of non-ALJs work for one agency
156 LIMON, supra note 58, app. C at chart of "2002 Top Ten List of Non-ALJs By Agency.".
157 Id. app. C at 6.
1s Id. app. C at 2.
1s9 For instance, the Navy was one of the top ten agencies in the Limon Study, but it did
not respond to our survey. Similarly, we did not hear from the Army or the Air Force, despite
their participating in the Limon Study. Although we did receive a response from the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals for the Department of Defense, its Defense Legal Services
Office did not respond to our survey as it did to the Limon Study. The NLRB reported the
number of non-ALJs for our survey, but not for the Limon Study.




(Commerce). Similarly, although only four agencies have more than
25 ALJs,162 ten agencies employ more than 25 non-ALJs.
2. Titles
As noted earlier, one of the difficulties in studying non-ALJs is
simply describing them because of their variety of titles. Agencies
reported having 37 types of non-ALJs, meaning that some agencies
or subcomponents have more than one type of non-ALJ (for
instance, Administrative Judges and Hearing Officers). Those 37
separately identified types of non-ALJs share 23 titles (meaning, for
example, that more than one agency may employ non-ALJs with the
title "Hearing Officer").
Figure 3 illustrates the various titles and the number of officials
that hold them. Seven of those titles include the honorific "judge"
and are held by nearly 1,000 (964) of the non-ALJs. And nearly 200
of those non-ALJs are referred to as "Administrative Judge," a title
that sounds very similar to "Administrative Law Judge."
Figure 3 - Non-ALJ Titles
Non-ALJ Titles No. of Non- "Judge"
ALJs in title
Administrative Appeals Judges 66 66
Administrative Judge 193 193
Administrative Patent Judge 275 275
Appeals Board Members 11
Appeals Officers 457
Attorney-Examiner / Senior Attorney 42
Board of Immigration Appeals Members 16
Board of Contract Appeals Judge (or AJ) 22 22
Copyright Royalty Judge 3 3
Decision Review Officer 535
Hearing Officer 651
Hearing Panelist 6








Presiding Officer 3 (plus ad
hoc)
Regional Directors 6
Regional Judicial Officer 10
Settlement Officers 257
Small Claims Officer 1
Veterans Law Judge 95 95
(total) 10,831 964
3. Salaries
Agencies provided salary data on 30 of the 37 types of non-ALJs
and 9,594 non-ALJs of the 10,831 reported non-ALJs.163 Of these
9,594 non-ALJs, we were able to calculate high or low base
salaries164 for 9,507 of them.165 We present the highest and lowest
base salaries for each category in the figures below (without
accounting for any locality pay or other adjustments). Agencies
reported the remaining 87 non-ALJs' salaries as using various
"other" pay scales for which we were unable to make specific
calculations.
Frye and Limon asked agencies to report pay scales or grades,
but they did not ask agencies to report how many of their non-ALJs
were paid under each grade.166 To have a better idea of how much
163 We received no salary information from the Administrative Office of the Courts, VA (for
either of its two kinds of non-ALJs), FDIC (whose non-ALJ is hired on an ad hoc basis), the
NLRB, the Peace Corps, and Treasury for its Labor Arbitrators (who are hired on a contract
basis).
164 The difference between the high and low base salaries varies based on steps or other
distinctions within a pay grade.
165 Agencies reported specified paygrades that we provided on the survey for 9,239 non-
ALJs. Agencies reported paying 355 non-ALJs under "other" pay scales, some for which we
did not have specific salary data. We were able, however, to calculate the salary ranges for
PTO's reported 268 Appellate Patent Judges. The PTO listed their salaries under the generic
"AD" pay scale ("Agency Determined"), but we were able to calculate their salaries as the PTO
posts these salaries on its website. USPTO 2014 AD PAY PLAN,
http://hr.commerce.gov/Employees/Compensation/PROD01_01030
2 (last visited July 27,
2017). We were unable to calculate the remaining 87 non-ALJs' salaries for whom their
agencies reported were paid under "other" pay plans. Accordingly, we were able to calculate
salaries for 9,507 non-ALJs (9,239 + 268 = 9,507).
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within a grade.171 Agencies reported non-ALJs' salaries at GS-9, 11,
12, 13, 14, and 15.172
Figure 6 details the number of non-ALJs (including patent
examiners), the highest and lowest base annual salaries for the
reported steps, and the range of total base salaries paid (based on
the highest and lowest steps) for the number of non-ALJs reported.
Figure 7 does the same but excludes patent examiners.
Figure 6- Non-ALJs on GS Pay Scale, inc. Patent Examiners
GS No. of Non- 2017 2017 Base Salary
Grade ALJs Lowest Highest Range
(n=8,797) Step Step Salary (in millions)
Salary
9 354 $43,251 $56,229 $15.3 - $19.9
11 507 $52,329 $68,025 $26.5 - $34.5
12 1,192 $62,722 $81,541 $74.8 - $97.2
13 2,039 $74,584 $96,958 $152.1 - $197.7
14 4,516 $88,136 $114,578 $398.0 - $517.4
15 189 $103,672 $134,776 $19.5 - $25.4
(total) $686.2 - $892.1
Figure 6 indicates the following number of non-ALJs paid under
the GS grades: 354 for GS-9; 507 for GS-11; 1,192 for GS-12; 2,039
for GS-13; 4,516 for GS-14; and 189 for GS-15.
Aside from the much larger number of reported patent examiners
since the 2002 Limon Study (our 7,856 to Limon's 1,000),173 a
notable difference arises in their salaries. The Limon Survey
reported that all patent examiners were paid at GS-15, the highest
GS grade.174 But the PTO reports in our survey that only 75 of the
patent examiners are paid at GS-15. More than half of the patent
examiners (4,225 of 7,856) are now paid at GS-14, and a large
portion are paid at GS-13 (1,731) and GS-12 (1,085), suggesting that
171 PAY & LEAVE, SALARIES & WAGES, SALARY TABLE 2017-GS [hereinafter
SALARY TABLE 2017-GS], https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-
wages/salary-tables/pdf/2017/GS.pdf. Base salaries at higher steps within a grade can exceed
the next higher-paying grade's base salary at its first step. For example, a GS-1 federal
employee at Step 5 earns $20,991, while a GS-2 federal employee at Step 1 earns only $20,829.
172 We did not request information about the steps under which non-ALJs were paid for
each pay grade (i.e., GS-15, Step 1 or Step 2).




the PTO may be providing lower salaries to conserve resources as it
hires substantially more patent examiners. But even with the PTO's
conservation, non-ALJs under the GS pay scale still cost the federal
government a range of approximately $686.2 to $892.1 million in
base salaries.
Because the substantial number of patent examiners may
obscure how agencies throughout the administrative state pay non-
ALJs, Figure 7 excludes patent examiners. None of the remaining
agencies reported any non-ALJs at GS-9. They reported 121 non-
ALJs at GS-11, 107 at GS-12, 308 at GS-13, 291 at GS-14, and 114
at GS-15. Agencies pay a range of base salaries to the reported non-
ALJs from $73.4 to $95.5 million.
Figure 7- Non-ALJs on GS Pay Scale, excl. Patent Examiners
GS No. of Non- 2017 Lowest 2017 Highest Base Salary
Grade ALJs Step Salary Step Salary Range (in
(n=941) millions)
9 0 $43,251 $56,229 $0
11 121 $52,329 $68,025 $6.3 - $8.2
12 107 $62,722 $81,541 $6.7 - $8.7
13 308 $74,584 $96,958 $23.0 - $30.0
14 291 $88,136 $114,578 $25.6 - $33.3
15 114 $103,672 $134,776 $11.8 - $15.3
(total) $73.4 - $95.5
Figure 8 disaggregates the GS grades by agency (excluding
patent examiners), rendering it easier to see how agencies pay their
non-ALJs. For instance, the Treasury Department primarily uses
the lower grades (GS-11, GS-12, and GS-13) for its more than 700
non-ALJs. Indeed, only Treasury and the FLRA use these lower
grades. All other agencies that pay non-ALJs under the GS grades
use GS-14 and GS-15, whose pay can overlap with ALJ base
salaries. 175
175 At Step 8 of GS-14 and Step 3 of GS-15, the base salaries ($108,702 and $110,584,
respectively) exceed the entry-level ALJ base salary of $108,100. Compare SALARY TABLE
2017-GS, supra note 171, with 2017-ALJ TABLE, supra note 167.
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Figure 8 - Non-ALJs on GS Pay Scale, by Agency, excl. Patent
Examiners
GS Agency Agency Office Non-ALJ Title No. of
Grade or Non-ALJs
Subcomponent n941
11 Treasury IRS Settlement Officers 72
Treasury IRS Appeals Officers 44
FLRA Office of Gen. Hearing Officer 5
Counsel
12 Treasury IRS Settlement Officers 45
Treasury IRS Appeals Officers 57
FLRA Office of Gen. Hearing Officer 5
Counsel
13 Treasury IRS Settlement Officers 132
Treasury IRS Appeals Officers 166
FLRA Office of Gen. Hearing Officer 10
Counsel
14 USDA Agric. Mktg. Presiding Officer 2
Serv.
Treasury IRS Settlement Officers 8
Treasury IRS Appeals Officers 156
EEOC Administrative 92
Judges
FMC Small Claims 1
Officer
FLRA Office of Gen. Hearing Officer 20
Counsel
MSPB Reg. & Field Administrative 6
Offices Judges
RRB Bureau of Hearing Officers 6
Hearings




DHS Coast Guard Hearing Officer 1
Treasury IRS Appeals Officers 34




EPA Off. of Admin. & Attorney-Examiner 2
Res.
FMC Hearing Officer 1
MSPB Reg. & Field Administrative 56
Offices Judges
MSPB Reg. & Field Chief 2
Offices Administrative
Judges
PBGC Appeals Board 6
Member
When excluding patent examiners, 25% of non-ALJs whose
salaries are calculable receive pay at GS-14 or GS-15 grades (405
out of 1,651). When including patent examiners, 50% of all non-
ALJs whose pay is calculable receive pay at these two grades (4,705
out of 9,507).
b. Non-ALJs on Special Pay Scales
The remaining 710 non-ALJs are paid under special pay scales.
They account for 7% of all 9,507 non-ALJs for whom agencies
provided specific salary information or 43% of those non-ALJs who
are not patent examiners (1,651).
These percentages for all non-ALJs (including patent examiners)
are similar to findings in the 1992 Frye Study. It indicated that
approximately 7% (165 out of 2,455) of all reported non-ALJs were
paid on special scales or "supergrades."176 But if, like our exclusion
of patent examiners from our findings, one excludes the largest
reported group of non-ALJs from the Frye Study (1,692 VA non-
ALJs), 22% (165 of 763) of non-ALJs were paid on special pay scales.
Notably, when excluding the largest group of non-ALJs, a
comparison of our data to the Frye Study suggests that special pay
scales are becoming more common for non-ALJs.177
The 710 non-ALJs not on the GS scale are paid under one of five
other scales (see Figure 9), which are further defined and discussed
below. All of these scales have salary ranges that overlap with (or
are the same as) ALJs' salary ranges.
176 Frye, supra note 58, app. B at 349. Of the 2,692 non-ALJs for whom agencies reported
some salary information, 237 of them were not government employees. Id. app B at 352. 165
of the remaining 2,455 non-ALJs were paid under supergrades or other special pay scales. Id.
app. B at 349.
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Likewise, as indicated in Figure 11, the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (BCA) uses a special pay scale for its Appeals
Judges. As required and determined by statute,179 the BCA Judges
receive pay according to a special pay scale (the CA-I through CA-3
pay scale).180 Their base salaries share some similarities with ALJs'
base salaries. Although the two highest grades are the same or
nearly identical to ALJs' pay grades, the entry base salary is
substantially higher (approximately $152,000 for BCA Judges and
$108,100 for ALJs).
Figure 11 - BCA Judges'Pay Scale (n=22)
Pay No. of DoD BCA 2017 Base Salaries or Total Salary
Scale Judges (n=22) Range (in millions)
CA-3 19 $152,186 $2.9
CA-2 2 $157,043 $0.3
CA-1 1 $161,900 $0.2
(total) $3.4
The 310 Immigration Judges (IJs) in the DOJ's Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) are paid under a special pay scale
(IJ-I through IJ-4) that is similar to the ALJ pay scale.181 Figure 12
indicates that the IJ pay scale has four grades, some of which are
higher and some of which are lower than similar AL-3 steps:
Figure 12 - IJs'Pay Scale (n=310)
Pay Scale No. of IMs 2017 Total Salary
(n=310) Base Salaries (in millions)
IJ-i 46 $109,970 $5.1
IJ-2 39 $125,680 $4.9
IJ-3 13 $141,390 $1.8
IJ-4 212 $144,532 $30.6
(total) $42.4
179 See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2) (2012) (noting that compensation for the Armed Services
Board is determined by section 5372a of title 5); 5 U.S.C. § 5372a(b) (2012) (describing the
rates of pay for contract appeals board members).
1so See SALARY TABLE NO. 2017-BCA, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-
leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdfl2017/BCA.pdf.




The remaining 314 non-ALJs (for whom we have calculable
salary information) are paid on special pay scales for which only
salary ranges are readily available.182 Forty-six non-ALJs are paid
under the Senior Executive Service (SES) or the Senior-Level and
Scientific or Professional Positions (SL/ST) pay scales. Notably,
under these scales, non-ALJs can obtain pay that exceeds ALJs'.
The ranges for both pay scales are the same.183 Two hundred sixty-
eight Appellate Patent Judges for the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board receive pay under an agency-determined pay scale (AD).184
Figure 13 provides additional detail, including agencies using the
SES pay scale, the number of non-ALJs paid under these scales, and
the salary ranges:
Figure 13- SES, SLIST, AD Pay Scales for Non-ALJs =314)
Pay Agency Agency Office No. of 2017 Total
Scale or Non- Base Salary Salary
Subcomponent ALJs Ranges (in
(n=31 millions)
SES or Commerce PTAB 7 $124,406 to $5.7 to
SL/ST DOE 1 $187,000 $8.6
HHS Office of 5
Secretary, DAB
DOJ EOIR, BIA 16
DOL BRB 5
GOA 5
MSPB Reg. & Field 6
Off.
182 Although we received data on special salary grades for 15 CFTC Hearing Officers, two
Coast Guard Hearing Officers, 40 Government Accountability Office ("GAO") Senior
Attorneys, and 30 Nuclear Regulatory Agency ("NRC") AJs, we were not readily able to
determine the base salaries or salary ranges for these non-ALJs.
183 PAY & LEAVE: SALARIES & WAGES, SALARY TABLE NO. 2017-SL/ST,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/
2017/SLST.pdf; PAY & LEAVE: SALARIES & WAGES, SALARY TABLE NO. 2017-ES,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-
tables/pdf/2017/ES.pdf.
18 USPTO 2014 AD PAY PLAN: SALARY TABLE ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES








Of all 9,507 non-ALJs for whom we had calculable base-salary
information, 5,415, or 57%, of those non-ALJs are paid within pay
scales or grades that overlap with ALJs' paygrades (GS-14, GS-15,
and all special pay scales). But if one excludes GS-14 because of its
very limited overlap with ALJ salary ranges, then only 8% of the
non-ALJs (829) have pay ranges that overlap with ALJs' pay. For
the same figures based on the 1,651 non-ALJs for whom we have
calculable base-salary information (when excluding patent
examiners), 68% have overlapping base-salary ranges with ALJs
(when including GS-14) or 50% (when excluding GS-14).18 5
B. TYPES OF NON-ALJ ORAL HEARINGS
Agencies reported 47 types of Non-ALJ Hearings because some
agencies have more than one type of Non-ALJ Hearing. For
instance, the CFTC has wage-garnishment, statutory-
disqualification, and reparation-award proceedings. We report here
our findings as to the nature of the 47 reported Non-ALJ Hearing
types, whether the non-ALJs' agency is a party to the hearing,
whether the non-ALJs' decision is final and the nature of any
administrative appeal, and whether the agency imposes case-
processing goals on the non-ALJ for the particular type of Non-ALJ
Hearing.
1. Nature of Hearings
Our questionnaire asked respondents to assign the hearings over
which their non-ALJs preside to one or more of six general subject
matter categories and an "other" category.
Figure 14 indicates the distribution of the 47 types of Non-ALJ
Hearings reported by the responding officials (with some kinds of
hearings fitting into more than one category): government benefits
(11), enforcement (ten), disputes between private parties (nine),























Government-Benefits Hearings. The reported government-
benefits hearings concerned HHS grants, PBGC benefits, and
disability benefits for veterans, railroad employees, and social-
security beneficiaries.
Enforcement Hearings. The enforcement hearings concerned
wage garnishments and disqualifications by the CFTC for
commodities brokers; penalties, fines, or other enforcement
remedies by the Coast Guard, DHS, DOE, EPA, HHS, or NRC;
immigration-removal proceedings in DOJ; and license-revocation
proceedings by the Federal Maritime Commission.
Hearings for Private Parties. Non-ALJs resolve disputes between
private parties in the context of commodities trading, specialty
agricultural products, intellectual property, benefits, labor
relations, maritime, and sexual-harassment claims.
Federal Employment and Government-Contract Hearings. Some
categories are self-explanatory and share similar contexts, but it
may be helpful to know of the agencies with these kinds of hearings.
Non-ALJ Hearings concerning federal employment disputes occur
within the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Treasury,
EEOC, FLRA, GAO, and MSPB. The DOD, EPA, and the GAO have
Non-ALJ Hearings concerning governmental contracts.
Licensing Hearings. Licensing hearings concern patents and
nuclear power for the Department of Commerce and the NRC,
respectively.
Miscellaneous Hearings. As for the "other" proceedings that do
not fit within our established categories, Treasury has hearings for
tax-assessment disputes, the FDIC and the NRC have hearings on
"miscellaneous" subject matter (without further description), and
NASA has hearings on public-private partnerships.
We are limited in our ability to compare these results with prior
studies. The 2002 Limon Study did not report Non-ALJ Hearing
types. The earlier 1992 Frye Study did report case types, but it
reported them in different categories than ours.189
189 See id. at 261-62 (organizing the types of hearings into five categories (enforcement,
entitlement, economic, employer-employee, and health and safety) and describing the cases
heard under each category in detail).
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2. Agency as a party
Concerns over non-ALJ independence are at their apex when the
non-AL's employing agency is a party at the Non-ALJ Hearing. To
be sure, agencies may have reasons to influence non-ALJs as to the
agency's policy preferences in hearings in which the agency does not
appear as a party. But the agency-as-a-party situation is more
problematic because it implicates the due process principle of nemo
iudex in sua causa, i.e., no one should judge his or her own case.190
The Supreme Court has held that impartiality principles under the
Due Process Clause apply to agency adjudication,191 but it has given
agencies a wide berth in the context of informal adjudication.19 2 A
party's "significant and disproportionate influence" on a judge's
selection, the party's ability to remove the judge, and the party's (or
the litigation's) ability to benefit the judge financially are relevant
as to whether the adjudicator has sufficient impartiality under the
Due Process Clause.19 3
Notably, ALJs had until recently a largely OPM-led appointment
process, a pay scale set by OPM regulations,194 prohibitions on their
at-will removal, and prohibitions on agencies paying them
bonuses.195 These conditions contribute to ALJ impartiality.19 6 The
statutes that promote ALJ impartiality do not apply to non-ALJs.
190 See Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo ludex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122
YALE L.J. 384, 384 (2012).
191 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1982) (holding that due process
demands impartiality of those who hold judicial or quasi-judicial functions); Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54 (1975) (holding that combination of functions for agency or its
members will usually not violate due process); id. at 47 (noting "presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators"); id. at 51 n.16 (noting lower-court decisions finding
due process violations for lesser officials within agencies that had combined functions).
192 See, e.g., id. at 48, 51 n.16, 54 (summarizing the court's guidance to agencies in
conducting informal adjudications); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (rejecting
due process challenge to non-ALJs based on their reporting relationship with investigative
and prosecutorial functions because of "the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings,
judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and against the special
considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in
exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters").
19s See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1674-78 (discussing the relevant factors the Court
considers when reviewing the impartiality of an ALJ).
194 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of superseding changes
to ALJ hiring.
195 See supra Part I.A.
196 Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978) (providing ALJs absolute immunity
based on their quasi-judicial function and "more importantly" the statutory structures that
"assure that the [ALJ] exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him").
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When agencies permit administrative appellate review, we asked
the agencies to describe the nature of the review. We asked them to
choose. all of the following that apply: automatic administrative
appellate review, discretionary review, review by an appellate panel
(whose members do not comprise the head(s) of the agency), review
by the head(s) of the agency, review by another agency official, or
review by another agency or a component of another agency. Some
of the results from responding agencies are provided in Figure 17.
Figure 17- Nature of Administrative Appellate Proceedings
(n=25)1 99
Nature of Administrative Appellate
Proceedings
Review by head(s) of agency 13
Review by agency official 4
Review by agency panel 4
Review by another agency 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
For either mandatory or discretionary administrative appeals,
four Non-ALJ Hearing types have review by an appellate panel, four
by another agency official, and a substantial 13 by the head of the
agency itself. No agency reported Non-ALJ Hearings whose appeals
went to a different agency.200 We were initially surprised at the
relatively large number of proceedings that the heads of agencies
reviewed. But when we reviewed those kinds of hearings, they
either appeared to be relatively rare proceedings or appeals to
199 Despite having 25 agencies report having appellate proceedings, not all of their
responses are indicated on the graph. Some, such as the EEOC, simply reported discretionary
appeals, while others, such as DOL/BRB only reported "other" (parties could choose to
appeal).
200 We did not ask agencies about the availability or nature of judicial review from the non-
ALJ or agency's decision.
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agencies that mainly or solely use adjudication. For instance,
appeals from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' fair-
employment-practices hearings, the DOE's proceedings concerning
improper actions surrounding student financial aid, and the NRC's
various nuclear-power hearings are likely not substantial in
number. And several of the agencies-such as the Federal Maritime
Commission, the MSPB, the NLRB, and the Railroad Benefits
Board-that permit or mandate appeals to the head(s) of the agency
act largely or solely through adjudication, rather than rulemaking.
Agencies reported only three Non-ALJ Hearing types as having
mandatory appellate proceedings: patent applications, certain
veterans-benefits decisions, and certain decisions concerning
nuclear energy.201
4. Case-Processing Goals
Quantitative case-processing goals and qualitative evaluations
have a lengthy and contentious history. The Frye Study indicated
that quantitative case-processing goals were widespread by 1992
(although Frye's presentation of the data renders them difficult to
compare with ours).202 As the Conference has previously recognized,
case-processing goals can improve productivity and
accountability.2 03 These values appear most salient when the
agency seeks efficient disposal of high-volume caseloads.
Nevertheless, some adjudicators (most famously, ALJs at SSA) have
criticized case-processing oals for interfering with their decisional
201 Although all 25 types of Non-ALJ Hearings with appellate proceedings must either be
mandatory or discretionary, we received only 17 responses to these binary variables (three
for mandatory and 14 for discretionary). We suspect hat the reported mandatory appellate
processes are accurate because of their rarity.
202 See Frye, supra note 58, at 270 (discussing how presiding officers with other duties
"must abide by [quantitative case processing standards] in ... 91% of the caseload").
203 See ADMIN CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 86-7: CASE MANAGEMENT AS A TOOL
FOR IMPROVING AGENCY ADJUDICATION 1, 3 (1986) (noting that "guidelines for timely case
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full-time non-ALJs for MSPB and 40 for FLSA), and social-security
matters (60). The only large groups of non-ALJs without case-
processing goals were Appellate Patent Judges (268) in appellate
patent matters and EEOC AJs (92) in certain employment matters.
Thus, the vast majority of non-ALJs are subject to case-processing
goals, even if the majority of Non-ALJ Hearing types are not.
C. NON-ALJ SELECTION
Agencies reported that applicants for 31 of the 37 identified types
of non-ALJs must meet minimum qualifications. We asked about
qualifications for (1) outside candidates whom agencies consider
hiring initially as non-ALJs and (2) agency employees whom
agencies move from another position within the agency to serve as
non-ALJs (whether or not through a formalized application or
selection process). Of the 31 non-ALJ types for which agencies
responded with qualifications information, 23 of those types are
hired both initially from outside the agency and from within, while
four are hired only from within and four are hired only from outside.
Agencies did not report any minimum qualifications for six of the
non-ALJ types. Most of those agencies-such as the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, the Treasury (for Labor Arbitrators), the
FDIC, or the Peace Corps-likely did not report any information
because of the short-term contractual (or temporary and rare)
nature of the individual's adjudication duties. These agencies likely
do not have formalized requirements. The responding official for the
FMC's two types of non-ALJs did not know what the qualifications
were, if any.
Agencies reported hiring persons outside the agency as non-ALJs
for 27 of the reported 37 non-ALJ types. We specifically asked
agencies about certain potential qualifications and asked them to
mark all qualifications that applied: a law degree; years of
government service, legal practice, litigation experience, and legal
practice concerning regulatory issues relevant to the Non-ALJ
Hearings; military service; adequate written work product; subject-
matter expertise; demeanor; and references. We also provided space
for them to identify other qualifications. As indicated in Figure 19,




Figure 19 - Minimum Qualifications (Initial Hires) (n=27)











Agencies require that nearly two-thirds of the 27 initially-hired
non-ALJ types (63%) have a law degree,206 and some impose related
requirements, such as expertise in general administrative law
(CFTC), bar membership (EEOC), a mix of litigation and subject-
matter expertise (EPA and Library of Congress), or dispute-
resolution experience (NASA). Applicants could meet agencies'
years-of-legal-practice requirement with between five and ten years'
experience. Only two other qualifications were common to more
than one-third of the types: consideration of demeanor and
references. Agencies reported "other" qualifications, such as
scientific degrees (PTO) and certain military rank (Coast Guard).
Perhaps the most interesting takeaway is that agencies reported
only considering subject-matter expertise when initially hiring non-
ALJs for eight non-ALJ types (or 12 types, if including an expansive
understanding of the qualifications with the "other" answers)-not
even half of the 27 types initially hired. Agencies often criticize OPM




for the difficulty in hiring ALJs and for OPM's refusal to consider
subject-matter expertise.207 But our findings suggest hat agencies
themselves do not always, or even usually, consider such expertise.
That said, agencies consider, without exception, expertise when
hiring non-ALJs who will work in scientific areas.208
Agencies reported moving existing employees into non-ALJ roles
for, coincidentally, 27 non-ALJ types (and thus indicating that some
agencies select non-ALJs from inside and outside of the agency).
Similar to initial hires, agencies require a law degree for 59% of the
non-ALJ types hired from within the agency. And agencies that
require years of legal practice impose from seven to ten years'
experience. Interestingly, as indicated in Figure 20, they reported
more types of minimum qualifications for internal hires. With these
internal hires, agencies were more likely than with outside hires to
consider subject-matter expertise, writing ability, demeanor, and-
perhaps most surprising-references. Indeed, agencies considered
law degrees, expertise, and demeanor for slightly more than half of
the non-ALJ types. Agencies reported similar qualifications under
"other" as they did for initial hires.
207 See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1704 (noting OPM's ALJ-hiring process does not consider
subject matter experience, but agencies "continue to request selective certification" (citations
omitted)). But see the recent developments as to ALJ hiring. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text.
208 PTO and NRC require expertise or scientific degrees.
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Figure 20 - Minimum Qualifications (Existing Employees) (n-27)










Agencies place 17 (46%) of the 37 identified types of newly hired
non-ALJs on probation. Agencies relied upon probationary periods
for 81% of non-ALJ types that hear benefits claims, 67% for those
that hear enforcement matters, 50% for those that hear licensing or
private-party disputes, 39% for those who hear federal employment
disputes, and none for those who hear government-contract
disputes. Only four (11%) are hired for a term of years, and none of
those four are subject to performance appraisals.
D. NON-ALJ OVERSIGHT AND INDEPENDENCE
For each of the 37 reported types of non-ALJs, we asked agencies
numerous questions that concern non-ALJs' independence and
impartiality. Specifically, we asked about (1) any limitations on the
non-ALJs' duties and their reporting relationships within the
agency, (2) any limitations on non-ALJs having ex parte
communications, (3) any physical separation from others in the
agency, (4) any requirements for recusal, (5) any performance
appraisals and eligibility for pay bonuses, and (6) any protections
from at-will removal. Throughout this discussion, we provide
comparisons to ALJs' protections and prohibitions.
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1. Separation of Functions
ALJs are prohibited by statute from performing investigative
or prosecutorial functions or reporting to an employee with those
functions.209 This separation of functions-prosecution from
adjudication-provides ALJs independence from the agencies who
are often parties in ALJ Hearings. We asked agencies about non-
ALJs' functions and limitations on their functions, as well as their
reporting relationships.
a. Non-ALJ Functions
We asked whether any authority prohibited non-ALJs from
performing duties aside from adjudication and, if so, the nature of
that authority. Figure 21 reports our results. Agencies indicated
that 16 (or 43%) of the 37 non-ALJ types had no required separation
of functions. This comprised the largest group. In addition, three
types worked for agencies that only adjudicate and thus have no
competing functions to separate. And three other types could
perform only adjudicative duties and thus had complete separation
of functions.
For the remaining 15 non-ALJ types, eight were prohibited from
engaging in investigative or prosecutorial functions (like ALJs). The
seven other types reported "other" limits. For instance, Treasury's
Settlement Officers cannot prosecute or investigate the cases that
they decide, Copyright Royalty Judges are limited by general ethics
and conflicts rules, and Presiding Officers for the CFTC cannot
report to an employee who prosecutes or investigates.
209 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(2), 3105 (2012) (stating that ALJs may not "perform duties
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges," nor "be
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in
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Custom Statute Proc. Rule Sub. Rule Internal Other
Guidance
Most of the responding agencies identified more than one source
for separation-of-functions requirements. For instance, DOD
indicated that its non-ALJs had separated functions via statute and
substantive rule. Treasury identified four sources (statute,
procedural rule, guidance, and custom), and DOJ/EOIR also
identified four (statute, substantive rule, guidance, and custom),
although DHS, not DOJ or EIOR, prosecutes immigration removal
proceedings before Immigration Judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals. 212
b. Reporting Relationships
Under the APA, ALJs may not report to those who investigate or
prosecute.213 We were interested in non-ALJs' reporting
relationships and asked agencies to identify to whom the non-ALJs
directly report. As Figure 24 reveals, agencies indicated as follows
(with the number of types who report to the indicated official in
parentheses): agency head(s) (2), agency officials who supervise
investigation/prosecution (3), chief non-ALJs (8), and other officials
(24).
212 See supra note 192.
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do not maintain similar separation. For instance, the Coast Guard's
Chief Hearing Officer reports to the Deputy Chief Counsel/Judge
Advocate General, the Peace Corps Chief Hearing Panelist reports
to an agency prosecutor or investigator, and the NRC's Chief
Administrative Judge reports to the Commissioners.
Notably, 65% of non-ALJ types (24 out of 37) reported having
direct supervisors other than the categories that we provided in the
survey. Respondents told us that these other supervisors ran the
gamut from, among other things, the "Director of Proceedings" at
the CFTC; the Manager of the Appeals Division at the PBGC;
supervisory non-ALJs (but not "chief non-ALJs") or Chief ALJs (not
"chief non-ALJs") at EEOC, PTAB, PTO, and FMC; various
attorneys and directors; and, incorrectly it appears, the chairperson
of EOIR's appellate board.216 These reporting relationships provide
at least some segregation from any agency-enforcement functions.
We also asked agencies whether there were specific limitations
on who could supervise non-ALJs, similar to how the APA addresses
supervision for ALJs. Slightly fewer than half of the non-ALJ types
have no limitations (18 out of 37).217 The others' limitations varied.
The CFTC prohibits its non-ALJs from reporting to an agency
prosecutor or investigator (as the APA does for ALJs). The USDA's
Agriculture Marketing Service requires that its non-ALJs report to
an independent entity within the USDA, the Office of General
Counsel. But most others reported lesser limitations, such as that
the supervisor for certain non-ALJs (for example, PTO's patent
examiners, Treasury's Settlement Officers, MSPB's non-ALJs, and
SSA's AAJs) had to have certain qualifications or had to be a specific
individual per statute or regulation (for example, Armed Forces
Board of Contract Appeals, Peace Corps' Hearing Panelists, and
EPA's Regional Judicial Officers).
216 Contrary to the questionnaire response, we think Immigration Judges' direct
supervisors are Assistant Chief Immigration Judges, not the Board of Immigration Appeals
chairperson. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (last updated
Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/offlice-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios.
217 We included in the calculation answers that indicated the only limitation was that the




One indicium of a fair proceeding and an independent
adjudicator is freedom from pressure from the agency or a party.
One way to limit such pressure or interference is to prohibit or limit
the adjudicator's ex parte contacts with parties. Likewise, ex parte
third-party communications can be unfair to parties who cannot
participate in those communications. Thus, limiting third-party
communications can increase the fairness and accuracy of the
hearing.
Several APA provisions prohibit certain ex parte
communications during ALJ Hearings. For instance, unless
otherwise permitted by law or excluded by the APA, ALJs may not
have ex parte communications with anyone concerning facts at
issue.218 ALJs may, however, discuss legal issues with others inside
the agency, unless those persons are employees who investigate or
prosecute the case at issue or one factually related.219 The APA
permits official notice of material facts under certain conditionS220
and other ex parte contacts as permitted by law.2 2 1
We surveyed agencies to ascertain whether non-ALJs had
similar prohibitions on their ex parte communications. We asked
them whether ex parte communications were permitted, and, if so,
which communications were permitted. And we asked what source
of law, if any, prohibited or limited ex parte communications.
Figure 25 indicates that agencies have no ex parte
communications prohibitions for five (or 14%) non-ALJ types, and
prohibit some ex parte communications for 11 types (30%). Agencies
prohibit all ex parte communications for 21 of the 37 non-ALJ types
(or 57%). Notably, the prohibition on all ex parte communications
(as to both matters of fact and law) is stricter than even the APA
standard for ALJs, which permits ALJs to discuss legal matters
with certain agency officials.222 This stricter prohibition is




222 See id. (restricting ALJs' intra agency ex parte contacts with only prosecutors and
investigators, but leaving open the possibility of communication with other agency employees
as long as the communication does not involve a "fact in issue").
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We also considered how agencies did or did not insulate non-
ALJs when the agency was a party to Non-ALJ Hearings. The
agency's status as a party likely places the most strain on the non-
ALJs' independence because of concerns that the non-ALJ will
communicate with those in the agency who seek to advance the
agency's litigating position.
As discussed earlier, the APA limits certain, but not all, ex parte
communications with certain adjudicators; we sought to understand
whether agencies with ex parte prohibitions have similar
prohibitions for non-ALJs. Agencies reported that no ex parte
communications are permitted for 10 (59%) of the 17 proceedings in
which the agency is a party (a standard that is stronger than the
APA's). Some ex parte communications are permitted for 4 (24%) of
those proceedings (a standard that would be similar to the APA's).
And all ex parte communications are permitted for 3 (18%) of them.
Overall, these findings are reassuring because 82% of Non-ALJ
Hearings with the agency as a party have ex parte prohibitions that
are at least similar to the APA's prohibitions for ALJ Hearings.
As indicated in Figure 26, agencies identified the sources of these
prohibitions on ex parte communications-whether in statute,
substantive rule (such as a notice-and-comment rule), procedural
rule, internal agency guidance, or custom-for 12 non-ALJ types
(with some agencies having more than one source).
Figure 26- Sources of Limitations on Ex Parte Communications
(n=12)














Notably, 67% of the agencies that responded to this question
indicated that the prohibition comes only in the least accessible and
transparent forms: internal guidance or custom or both. Agencies'
substantial reliance on custom is problematic because it is likely to
be unwritten, opaque, and open to varied construction by different
non-ALJs.
For those non-ALJ types for which agencies limit ex parte
contacts, we asked agencies about the nature of those limitations.
None of the agencies that limit (as opposed to those that prohibit
all) ex parte communications prohibited either all communications
related to fact or all communications related to law. Instead,
agencies prohibit six non-ALJ types from discussing facts only with
certain agency officials (as opposed to prohibiting discussion with
anyone), and agencies prohibit seven types from discussing legal
issues with certain agency officials.227 Agencies prohibit five types
of non-ALJs from discussing both facts and legal issues with persons
outside the agency (Peace Corps, NASA, RRB, and two types for
Treasury).
3. Physical Separation
A related question asked agencies whether their non-ALJs were
physically separated from other agency employees. Paul Verkuil
reported in 1976 that the Department of Interior's physical
separation and new titles for its non-ALJs led some to assert that
the "resulting decisions on informal appeals are less institutionally
oriented, more objective and ultimately more fair." 2 28 He lauded the
agency for its "internal agency reform that . . . substantially
increased the impartiality of the informal decision making at a low
cost to the system."2 29 Indeed, physical separation would likely
encourage an agency culture that views the non-ALJs as being
separate from the rest of the agency in function. Moreover, fewer
casual "water-cooler interactions" between non-ALJs and agency
employees should also create some psychological separation from
agency employees who shape agency litigation or policy positions.
227 The six types in the former group-two non-ALJ types for Treasury, three types for
MSPB, and one type for PBGC-are also six of the types for the latter group.








































Agencies require 31 (84%) of the 37 non-ALJ types to recuse
themselves if they cannot serve as an unbiased adjudicator in a
case. For those with recusal requirements, as indicated in Figure
28, agencies identified the sources that require recusal (selecting all
that apply). More than half of the 31 agencies with limitations rely
on regulations to do so, providing meaningful transparency and
clarity to those requirements. In contrast, more than a third (11 of
31) of the non-ALJ types' limitations arise, at least in part, from
custom. Seven of those 11 non-ALJ types had limitations that arose
only from custom.
Figure 28 - Sources of Recusal Obligation (n=31)










Regulation Custom Guidance Other Statute
As for the responses that marked "other," agencies reported that
the limitations arose from contractual provisions (non-ALJs hired
on an ad-hoc basis, such as for the Administrative Office of the
Courts), "general government ethics requirements" or "ethical
considerations" (for DOE, Commerce, EPA, and DHS), or
"certification" (required for certain EPA actions). Agency reliance on
seemingly vague "ethical considerations" likely leaves substantial
discretion to non-ALJs.
No recusal requirement exists for the following six non-ALJ
types: CFTC's Presiding Officers, the Treasury's Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, both non-ALJ types within the VA,
the FLRA's Hearing Officers, and NASA's Ombudsman.
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5. Performance Appraisals and Bonuses
To promote independence from their agencies, ALJs are exempt
from civil-service performance appraisals and cannot receive
bonuses from their agencies.230 We sought to ascertain whether non-
ALJs had similar protections from agency oversight.
First, we asked agencies whether their non-ALJ types were
subject to performance appraisals. If so, we asked about the nature
of the appraisals. Second, we asked whether the agency awarded
bonuses to non-ALJs (based on performance appraisals). If so, we
asked for the amounts or ranges of bonuses awarded in 2016.
Finally, we asked whether the agency had set up any means of
preventing the appraisals from affecting the non-ALJs' impartiality.
a. Subject to Performance Appraisals
The majority of non-ALJs by type and by number are subject to
performance appraisals. 28 of the 37 types of non-ALJs (76%) are
subject to performance appraisals,231 and all but 68 of the 10,831
total non-ALJs are subject to performance appraisals.232 In other
words, an overwhelming 99% of all non-ALJs are subject to
performance appraisals. 233 Of the ten agencies (excluding the
Department of Commerce) with more than 25 non-ALJs,234 nine
administer performance appraisals for their non-ALJs. Of the 2,608
non-ALJs that these ten agencies employ, almost all (2,573) have
performance appraisals.235
230 See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1655-56.
231 The nine non-ALJ types without performance appraisals are the Administrative Office
of the Courts, DOD, Treasury (Labor Arbitrators), FDIC, GAO (Personnel Appeals Board
Members), the Library of Congress, NASA, NRC, and the Peace Corps.
232 The agencies and the number of non-ALJs not subject to performance appraisals are as
follows: Administrative Office of the Courts (1), DOD (22), GAO (five Personnel Appeals
Board Members), the Library of Congress (3), NASA (1), NRC (30), and the Peace Corps (6).
The FDIC and Treasury Labor Arbitrators are hired only on an ad hoc basis.
2" See infra Figure 30.
234 See supra Figure 2.
235 Of the ten listed agencies with more than 25 non-ALJs (excluding Commerce), only the
NRC did not use performance appraisals for any of its (30) non-ALJs. The GAO reported that












































performance appraisals for the different types of non-ALJs who
preside over hearings in which the agency is a party. The appraisals
could serve as a subtle (or not so subtle) method of influencing non-
ALJ decision- making.
Given the significant percentage of non-ALJ types and total
number of non-ALJs who are subject to performance appraisals, we
were not surprised to find that agencies conduct appraisals on 71%
of non-ALJ types that hear proceedings in which agencies are a
party (and for 89% of non-ALJ types that hear enforcement
matters).23 7 This percentage, slightly smaller than the overall
percentage of non-ALJ types subject to appraisals (76%), suggests
some agency sensitivity to Non-ALJ Hearings in which the agency
is a party. But the percentage is still substantial and indicates that
agencies are using what the APA regards as a suspect ool on judges
who conduct proceedings for which concerns over impartiality are
most sensitive.
b. Nature of Performance Appraisals
To understand the nature of the non-ALJs' performance
appraisals, we asked agencies that subject non-ALJs to performance
appraisals to identify whether the appraisals included
consideration of (1) quantitative case-processing goals, (2) input
from litigants, (3) peer review, (4) qualitative review of the non-
ALJs' decisions themselves, (5) reversal rates of the non-ALJs'
decisions, or (6) other factors. We asked them to identify all that
apply, and agencies reported information on the performance
appraisals for 26 of the 28 non-ALJ types that are subject to
performance appraisals.238
237 Agencies conduct appraisals for 100% of non-ALJ types that hear benefits matters, 77%
for federal employment disputes, 75% for licensing and for disputes between private parties,
71% for enforcement, and 67% for government contracts.
238 The FMC did not report information for its two non-ALJ types.
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Figure 31 - Nature of Performance Appraisals (n=26)







As Figure 31 indicates, the two most used factors in non-ALJs'
performance appraisals are case-processing oals (for 81% of non-
ALJ types for which we received responses) and review of non-ALJs'
decisions (69%). Reversal rates, litigant input, and peer review are
relatively rare.2 39
The 11 "other" responses provided more detail. For example,
agencies for certain non-ALJ types-such as the DOE's AJs and
HHS's Departmental Appeals Board Members-also consider non-
ALJs' administrative responsibilities. The MSPB considered
government-wide performance standards for the Senior Executive
Service when reviewing its Regional Directors.
Some of these "other" responses suggested that certain appraisal
criteria, if not properly cabined, could implicate decisional
outcomes. The Coast Guard, for instance, considers its non-ALJs'
adherence to agency guidance on impartiality, fairness, and
achieving remedial goals of the civil-penalty process. Other
agencies, such as the VA, echoed the Coast Guard by indicating that
they consider compliance with statutes and regulations or "job
knowledge." SSA and Treasury reported considering vague (and
potentially troubling) "business results."
239 Only two responses-from GAO's Senior Attorneys and DOL's Benefits Review Board-
identified a single factor for their performance reviews. The others provided more than one
factor.
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Figure 34 - Percentage of Non-ALJs Who Received Bonuses in
2017, by non-ALJ type (n=15)
Percent of Non-ALJs Receiving Bonuses in
2016 (by non-ALJ type)
100 100 100 100 100 100











Despite the significant percentage of non-ALJs who are subject
to performance appraisals, the reported amounts of the bonuses are
usually within a relatively narrow range. Of the 20 non-ALJ types
that are eligible for bonuses, agencies reported information on the
range of the bonuses for 10 of them.2 4 1
Figure 35 - Bonus Ranges n=10)
Agency - Title Type of % Bonus
Subcomponent Hearing Receiving Range
Bonuses




HHS - Departmental Enforcement 100% $10,OOOK
Departmental Appeals Bd. (max).
Appeals Bd. Members
241 See Figure 35.
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Treasury - IRS Settlement Tax- 78% $898 to
Officers assessment $1,669
Appeals disputes 87% $1,010 to
Officers $2,245
EPA - Office of Attorney- Gov't 100% $1,000 to
Grants and Examiners Contracts $2,000
Disbarments
MSPB - AJs Federal 90% $600
Regional and Chief AJs Employment 100% 4%
Field Officers Regional Disputes 83% 0% to 6%
Directors
NLRB Hearing Labor- approx. $713 to
Officers Representatio 50% $2,325
n Disputes
PBGC Appeals Bd. Gov't 100% 1% to 2%






RRB - Bureau Hearings Gov't 33% 2.5% to
of Hearings Officers Benefits 3% of
and Appeals annual
salary
SSA - Office of AAJs Gov't 90% $500 to
Appellate Benefits $2,500
Operations I I I
Some of the reported bonus ranges seem substantial. For
instance, the BRB's bonuses of $6,775 to $14,476 are 5% to 8% of
the AAJs' base salaries of $124,406 to $187,000, respectively.
Likewise, the high end of bonuses for PTAB APJs ($36,000) are
more than 20% of their highest permissible base salary of $167,000.
Others are relatively modest, such as the $600 bonuses for MSPB




d. Precautions with Performance Appraisals and Bonuses
We concluded our inquiry on performance appraisals and
bonuses by asking whether agencies that used performance
appraisals took any precautions to ensure that the appraisals did
not interfere with non-ALJs' impartiality.242 Agencies reported
precautions for 17 non-ALJ types.
Figure 35- Precautions to Protect Impartiality (n=1 7)
Agency - Title Precaution Category
Subcompo
nent
Commerce APJs No relationship with Not related to
- PTAB any particular hearing outcomes
Education Ads No relationship with Not related to
- Office of any outcome and some outcomes
Hearings level of separation of
and functions
Appeals
HHS - Departmental Chair of Board solely Separation of
Departme Appeals Board responsible for Functions
ntal Members assessments and
Appeals appeals to Deputy
Board Secretary are available
DHS - Hearing Agency directive Not related to
Coast Officers prohibits tracking outcomes
Guard amount of assessed




DOJ - Immigration Pass/Fail Appraisal Nature of





242 Some others responded that they had no precautions or other information that did not
indicate general or specific limitations. For instance, FLRA indicated that its non-ALJs do
not issue decisions; they simply take evidence. The PTO reported that Patent Examiners'
appraisals have "quality reviews."
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DOL - AAJs Assessments do not Not related to
BRB consider how AAJs outcomes
decide cases
Treasury - Settlement Assessments cannot Not related to
IRS Officers consider amount of tax outcomes
collection, and
Appeals supervisors must certify
Officers that amounts don't
affect evaluation
GAO Senior Required disclosure of Conflict-of
Attorneys conflicts of interest Interests
Limitations
MSPB - AJs Qualitative and Nature of
Regional Chief AJs quantifiable standards; Standards or
and Field Regional internal agency Scoring
Offices Directors grievance procedure or
review by other officials
NLRB Hearing Appraisals consider Not related to
Officers only the thoroughness outcomes
of the Hearing Officer's
development of the
evidentiary record
PBGC Appeals Bd. Rated on quality and Nature of
Members quantity of decisions, as Standards or
well as being impartial; Scoring
expected to follow law,
regulations, and
policies
RRB Hearings Not based on outcomes, Not related to
Officers but instead timeliness, outcomes
hearings held, number
of decisions issued, and
accuracy of citations
and regulations used in
decisions
SSA AAJs Not related to Not related to
decisional outcomes outcomes
Although we were not able to categorize bonus ranges, we were
able to categorize agency efforts to mitigate performance appraisals'
effects on non-ALJ impartiality. We categorized the reported
82 [Vol. 53:1
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Part I, agencies benefit from the existence and appearance of non-
ALJ impartiality. This appearance comes in part from structural
protections regarding non-ALJs' selection, oversight, and removal.
What follows is general commentary on how agencies might
promote and protect non-ALJ independence. Many of these
suggestions derive from related APA provisions or, as our data
indicate, existing agency practice for non-ALJs.
We recognize, however, that agencies must account for numerous
variables-such as budget limitations, personnel issues, statutory
mandates, and various forms of adjudication-that render absolute
rules or detailed suggestions impractical and unhelpful. And to be
clear, we do not contend here that any or all of these suggestions are
required by the Due Process Clause, even if they touch on matters
that the Supreme Court has identified as relevant to adjudicator
bias. But implementation of these suggestions, or other alternatives
that promote impartiality, may have the beneficial side effect of
insulating Non-ALJ Hearings from any constitutional concern.
Likewise, many of these suggestions will be subject to debate
either because of their actual or perceived costs or their specific
application to particular adjudicatory programs. Because of this
anticipated debate, we offer these alternatives as a suggested guide
for agencies to recognize key indicia of impartiality and discuss
these indicia within their agencies and with other agencies. Because
non-ALJs are not subject to uniform statutory provisions, their
protections have likely grown organically-perhaps without
systemic contemplation-as each agency has established its non-
ALJ program or particular Non-ALJ Hearings. Our goal with these
observations is to help agencies think more systemically about their
Non-ALJ Hearings and their non-ALJs' appearance of impartiality.
A. NON-ALJ SELECTION.
1. Agencies might consider using a panel-based process to select
their non-ALJs.
While our survey did not explore the mechanisms that each
agency uses to hire non-ALJ adjudicators248 we know that non-ALJ
hiring processes-whether external or internal-vary significantly
248 See supra Part II.A.
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across agencies, and that some are more transparent han others.249
Agencies might consider a process, where permissible and
feasible,250 for selecting non-ALJ adjudicators that is similar to the
process for selecting federal magistrate and bankruptcy judges,251
as well as for at least some judges in 29 states and the District of
Columbia.252 Sometimes called "merit selection," this process is
generally one in which a panel screens and interviews applicants
and recommends one or more to the appointing authority. Panel
composition varies among the different processes, but usually
includes various types of attorneys, laypersons, and judges. The
appointing authority usually must select a candidate from the
panel's list, although in some systems the appointing authority may
request a second list of candidates.253
We emphasize that agencies must account for the nature of their
adjudications to determine whether this alternative hiring
249 See Memorandum from Amber Williams and Megan Gibson to Matt Weiner et al.,
Selection, Performance Appraisal, and Removal Processes of non-Administrative Law Judge
Adjudicators (undated) (on file with authors).
250 Because of various OPM regulatory requirements concerning hiring for different kinds
of federal employees, agencies should coordinate with OPM when setting up a panel-based
hiring process to ensure that the panel complies with any relevant law. For instance, OPM
permits agencies to identify "selective factors" in hiring GS employees and to request, in rare
instances, additional qualification standards. See Classification & Qualifications: General
Schedule Qualification Policies, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/
classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-policies/#url=estb (last visited
Oct. 8, 2018). OPM already has a Qualifications Review Board for SES hires. See Senior
Executive Service: Selection Process, OPM.Gov, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/senior-executive-service/selection-process/#url=Qualifications-Review-Board (last
visited Oct. 8, 2018).
251 See generally MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIVISION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE
SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES
(2002); MALIA REDDICK & NATALIE KNOWLTON, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., A CREDIT TO THE COURTS: THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT
PROCESS FOR BANKRUPTCY JUDGES (2013), http://iaals.du.edulsites/
default/files/documents/publications/ascredittothecourts.pdf.
252 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS, http://iaals.du.edulprojects/judicial-nominating-commissions.
253 The Supreme Court held that the ALJs for the Securities & Exchange Commission were
"officers of the United States," and thus the Appointments Clause required that the
Commission itself, not others within the SEC, appoint them. See Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2053-55 (2018). The Appointments Clause does not care "a whit about who" appoints
"lesser functionaries." Id. at 2050-51. Whether all or certain non-ALJs are "officers" does not
affect our suggestion. Our suggestion for panel-based selection calls for the panel only to
recommend candidates to the hiring authority, and it calls for the agency itself (not Congress)
to set up the process.
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mechanism is appropriate for their adjudicator types. We present
this suggested alternative practice as but one way for agencies to
promote adjudicator independence and impartiality as part of the
hiring process. Moreover, no single type of panel-based system will
universally apply to all non-ALJs. Instead, we describe a
prototypical process to help agencies consider whether and how to
set up a panel-based system that is optimal for their non-ALJs.
Selection panels for non-ALJs could include sitting non-ALJs
(from within or outside the agency) with varying degrees of
seniority, agency officials, and other representatives of regulated
parties, with a high-level agency official making the ultimate
appointment. Specific agency regulations can clarify how such
panels will be assembled, identify categories of persons who must
and must not be panel members, and explain who will select the
members. By implementing set, staggered terms for panel
members, agencies will promote continuity and stability, and
benefit from more senior members' experience. Furthermore, panel-
based selection systems can embrace clear qualifications for
hiring-education and practice requirements, age, independence
from appointers, and personal attributes such as moral character,
judicial temperament, and commitment o equal justice.2 54
Our survey provided little evidence of comprehensive hiring
criteria for non-ALJs. At least where non-ALJs will be performing
similar functions, we recommend that they possess, and be hired
based upon, the same baseline qualifications across agencies for
similarly situated non-ALJs-a goal that ACUS and OPM might
wish to cultivate. In our study, agencies considered merit-based
characteristics-beyond simply having a law degree-in fewer than
half of the non-ALJ types.255 Most agencies do not formally consider
criteria that are virtually boilerplate in other judicial hiring
contexts, such as personal and professional references, demeanor,
and quality of writing. In some agencies and for some non-ALJ roles,
subject-matter expertise may also be desirable, or even essential, to
performing the non-ALJ's duties.256
254 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (2012) (discussing the requirements for federal magistrate
judges).
255 See supra Figure 19 - Minimum Qualifications (Initial Hires) (n=27).
256 See, e.g., REDDICK & KNOWLTON, supra note 251, at 14-15 (explaining various views on
the importance of prior experience in bankruptcy law when selecting bankruptcy judges).
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To ascertain whether applicants meet the prescribed
qualifications, a panel-based process typically calls for completion
of an application form, evidence of legal scholarship, names and
contact information for personal and professional references, and at
least one round of interviews. Announcements of vacant positions
and instructions for applying are usually widely circulated in local
newspapers, bar journals and newsletters, and websites of bar
associations and the hiring entity. Similar practices for agencies
that use non-ALJs would ensure consistency in the levels of
competence and experience in applicants. This proposal would
expand the professional and demographic diversity of applicants.257
A panel-based hiring process offers several benefits, but it also
likely has significant costs. First, supporters believe it promotes a
fair, thorough, and transparent hiring process that encourages
highly qualified applicants to apply. Also, it may inspire confidence
in the quality and impartiality of administrative adjudicators,
especially among those who will interact with the adjudicators. This
final point is especially relevant for agencies that hire both from
within and outside the agency; panel-based hiring can help ensure
that a pro-agency culture does not form within the agency's non-
ALJs corps.
But a panel-based hiring process would also have costs
(especially start-up costs). Agencies must expend time and money
to establish relevant hiring criteria and decide on how to compose
the panels, how the panels will process the applicants, and how
quickly the panels can interview and hire applicants. Furthermore,
once an agency makes those decisions, it faces the time and expense
of administering the system. Thus, the use of panels may slow
hiring, which may in turn delay agency adjudications.
Nevertheless, a panel process is not alien to agency adjudication,
and it gives agencies more control over hiring than the agency has
in other contexts. A non-ALJ panel-selection process is similar to
the ALJ-selection process through OPM, and is already used for
hiring members of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.258 For
ALJs, OPM has statutory authority to control the hiring criteria and
257 Common hiring qualifications and applications will also better facilitate the sharing of
non-ALJs, as discussed infra Part V.B.
258 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2)(B) (2012).
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timing for administering the AL written examination.259 Because
OPM would not oversee the non-ALJ selection process, agencies
would have more authority over the initiation and timing of the
process and more ability to determine the characteristics for non-
ALJs-such as subject-matter expertise-which is not currently a
permissible factor in AL hiring. In short, a panel-based process for
non-ALJs would share many of the benefits of ALT hiring without
suffering from what agencies have frequently argued are the
demerits of the ALJ-hiring process.
B. NON-ALJ OVERSIGHT AND INDEPENDENCE
1. Agencies might consider implementing separation of functions
for non-ALJs and separating non-ALJs from others in the agency.
By limiting non-ALJs' functions and their interactions with
certain agency officials, agencies may enhance non-ALJs'
appearance of impartiality and limit subconscious sympathy to
agency missions and positions. The presence of purportedly
unprofessional hearing examiners who were overly integrated
within the agency was one of the most significant criticisms of
administrative adjudication before the APA. 2 6 0 In response, the
drafters of the APA recognized the benefits of internally separating
adjudicators from those who handle other phases of the adjudication
process.261 Physical separation can enhance the separation of
functions by providing the non-ALJ with psychological separation
from the agency's mission and enforcement or other priorities.
Separation is most salient when the agency is a party to
"accusatory" proceedings, as the drafters of the APA noted when
protecting ALJs.262 Agencies provide separation of functions when
they are parties to Non-ALJ Hearings for most non-ALJ types. For
47% of the non-ALJ types who preside over matters in which the
agency is a party, agencies either provide complete separation of
269 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (providing that the OPM has the authority to recruit and examine
applicants including "developing and administering the administrative law judge
examinations" under 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3304, 1104(a), and 1302).
260 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
261 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d. Sess. 24-25 (1946). The drafters noted that a minority of the Attorney General's
Committee advocated for an entity separate from the agency (or a court) to preside.
262 Id. at 24.
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functions, separate non-ALJs from prosecutorial or investigative
functions, or engage only in adjudication (and thus find separation
unnecessary). 263 But even with these efforts, agencies provide lesser
protections for approximately 12% of non-ALJs types or fail to
provide separation at all for nearly 36% of them.2 6 4 There is
longstanding and widespread acceptance of separation of
functions.265 And its use for more than a majority of non-ALJ types
that preside over hearings in which the agency is a party indicates
that separation is feasible for most if not all agencies.
Even when the agency is not a party to proceedings and does
more than adjudicate, the agency may still have objectives that non-
ALJs may internalize as shared goals. Non-ALJs may come to
internalize these goals either by participating in other agency
activities or being a part of the "water-cooler" culture within the
agency. Separation of functions, although not as pressing as in the
agency-party context, still appears likely to promote a non-ALJ
culture that is shielded from excessive identification with the
agency's mission.
Aside from prohibiting non-ALJs from engaging in certain
agency activities, agencies may want to ensure that, as with ALJs,
non-ALJs do not report directly to agency officials who prosecute,
investigate, or oversee those who do and consider other potentially
problematic reporting relationships that may be particular to their
agency and Non-ALJ Hearings. The substantial number of non-ALJ
types who respond to various agency officials-as well as the
diversity of form of agency adjudication and agency organization-
renders it difficult for us to evaluate particular responses. But the
guiding principle for agencies should be to ensure that their non-
ALJs are insulated from agency officials who are responsible for
formulating and executing agency policy preferences, especially
agency officials related to enforcement or other matters in which the
agency is a party.
Separation of functions, similar to other protections concerning
non-ALJ independence, may prove trickier for agencies that rarely
hold Non-ALJ Hearings or that have a longstanding culture of
268 See Figure 21 and accompanying text.
264 Id.
265 See ASIMOW, supra note 59, at 21-22 (recommending separation of functions similar to
those provided in the APA).
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having agency officials adjudicate and handle numerous other
agency tasks. Agencies that rarely have Non-ALJ Hearings may
consider funneling existing hearings from several regional offices
into one office (such as the one that routinely has the most hearings)
and sharing a non-ALJ with other agencies who rarely hold Non-
ALJ Hearings (similar to agencies that rarely hold ALJ Hearings
and borrow ALJs from other agencies). For agencies that have a
longstanding culture of having non-ALJs with adjudication and
other duties, they might consolidate the hearing responsibilities to
a group of fulltime non-ALJs. Agencies will certainly incur upfront
costs in reorganizing their offices to accommodate non-ALJ
independence. But given the growing formality of Non-ALJ
Hearings and the recognized relationship between separated
functions and independence, these largely upfront costs are likely
not unreasonable, especially considering that increased fairness of
Non-ALJ Hearings inures to agencies' benefit by giving these
hearings more legitimacy.
2. Agencies might consider limiting non-ALJs' ex parte
communications concerning the merits of any agency adjudication
over which they are presiding.
Limiting non-ALJs' ex parte communications is perhaps the
easiest change that agencies can make. Indeed, agencies have
prohibited all ex parte communications for more than half (57%) of
the non-AJ types and limited some ex parte communications for
nearly 30% more.2 66 Only about 14% of the non-ALJ types have no
limitations on ex parte communications.267 Agencies, however, often
rely only upon internal guidance or custom (or both) for
implementing prohibitions.2 68 Agencies might consider making
these prohibitions more transparent and binding by reducing them
to writing, preferably in a rule.
Although the APA prohibits ALJs from ex parte communications
with those within the agency only as to factual matters,269
prohibiting ex parte communications as to both fact and law for non-
ALJs, except as required for the disposition of ex parte matters as
266 See Figure 25.
267 Id.
268 See Figure 26 - Sources of Limitations on Ex Parte Communications (n=12).
269 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1).
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permitted by law,2 7 0 is consistent with ACUS's Model Adjudication
Rules (for ALJ and Non-ALJ Hearings).271 Agencies have widely
implemented this total prohibition in Non-ALJ Hearings (for 57% of
non-ALJ types).272 Despite a broad ex parte prohibition, non-ALJs
can seek legal input from agency officials via amicus briefs or
testimony-to which the parties can respond.
Limiting non-ALJs' ex parte communications does not interfere
with the agency's prerogative. Even if non-ALJs are prohibited from
communicating ex parte on factual and legal matters, agency heads
(or their delegates) may still decide legal matters de novo on
administrative appeal (to the extent permitted by law). The APA
permits the agency to do so in ALJ Hearings.273 Moreover, the
agency may still respond to non-ALJ decisions by issuing clarifying
rules or other guidance.274 To be sure, drafting amicus briefs and
issuing guidance are usually more costly in time and money than
oral communications between agency officials and adjudicators. But
the efficiency of ex parte oral or written communications has its own
costs. That efficiency limits the transparency and participatory
values that adjudication seeks to further. Our recommended ex
parte prohibition furthers the appearance of non-ALJs' impartiality
by prohibiting backroom conversations and eliminating the
suggestion of hearings with preordained outcomes. Although fair
proceedings (in fact and in appearance) are not free, the cost that
our suggestion imposes is one that numerous agencies have already
accepted.
We recognize, however, that our suggestion, the noted agency
practice, and the current MAR are inconsistent with a 2016 ACUS
recommendation concerning ex parte communications in informal
adjudications.275 That recommendation would permit some factual
and legal discussions between adjudicators and certain agency
270 See ASlMOW, supra note 59, at 20-21 (recommending similar limitation on ex parte
contacts).
271 See ACUS Model Adjudication Rules § 120(A) (Admin. Conference of the U.S. 2018).
272 See Figure 25.
273 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
274 See, e.g., Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 78-79, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
Department of Health and Human Services could promulgate an interpretative rule in
response to a non-ALJ decision that concluded the opposite statutory construction of a
Medicare statute).
275 See Recommendation 2016-4, supra note 52.
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officials, but would not permit discussions with those directly
involved in investigative or prosecutorial roles in the pending or
related adjudication.276 For the reasons stated, we recommend a
stronger standard, which our data demonstrate is feasible for many
agencies.
3. Agencies might consider memorializing recusal requirements
for non-ALJs.
As with prohibitions on ex parte communications, agencies
generally require non-ALJs to recuse themselves if they are unable
to serve as unbiased adjudicators (for approximately 84% of non-
ALJ types).277 It seems sensible for agencies to do the same for all
non-ALJ types. Non-ALJs need clear statements of the grounds for
recusal (e.g., actual bias or that the non-ALJ's impartiality can be
reasonably questioned, aside from the fact that she works for the
agency). Agencies might also consider how parties may go about.
seeking a non-ALJ's recusal, including the procedure for the
decision itself and any appeal from it.278 As with prohibitions on ex.
parte communications, agencies often rely on custom.2 7 9 But custom
lacks clarity, transparency, salience, and binding effect. The
widespread use of recusal requirements indicates that this change
should be easy to implement.280
4. Agencies might consider promulgating clear criteria that are
unrelated to case outcomes for non-ALJs' performance appraisals
and bonus eligibility.
The APA drafters were keenly aware of the relationship among
performance appraisals, bonuses, and raises; drafters were also
aware of the real or perceived effect of these relationships on
276 Id.
277 See infra Part V.D.4.
278 See ASIMOW, supra note 59, at 23 (recommending that agencies require recusal for bias,
clarify the grounds for recusal, and consider procedural matters surrounding recusal).
279 See Figure 28 - Sources of Recusal Obligation (n=31)
280 See, e.g., RUSSELL WHEELER & MALiA REDDICK, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL Sys., JUDICIAL RECuSAL PROCEDURES: A REPORT ON THE IAALS CONVENING 4
(2017), http://iaals.du.edu/quality-judges/publications/judicial-recusal-procedures (surveying
different state recusal procedures and recommending ways to review and modify them,
including having "written, clearly articulated judicial recusal procedures"). Many of the
suggestions regarding recusal procedures and templates provided for both litigants and
judges in this report are relevant in the administrative context.
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adjudicator independence. To mitigate these concerns, the drafters
precluded agencies from affecting ALJs' pay with performance
appraisals.281 We recognize the nearly universal practice of
subjecting non-ALJs to performance appraisals and the significant
benefits such appraisals can provide in furthering efficiency and
accountability.282 Below are some suggestions on how agencies may
better ensure that performance appraisals for non-ALJs do not
impinge upon non-AJ independence and create as little due-
process concern as possible.
Providing clear factors for non-ALJs' appraisals (and each
factor's individual weight in the overall assessment) seems likely to
encourage transparency and impartial appraisals. Many factors
that agencies already consider are not problematic. For instance,
obtaining litigant input is helpful in assessing non-ALJs' demeanor
and case-management abilities. One effective and efficient way of
garnering that input is the administration of surveys to nonagency
parties to the hearings. Non-ALJ peer review can also be an
effective tool in helping assess non-ALJs' fulfillment of
administrative duties and identifying issues related to docket
management. For sample surveys of litigants (including attorneys)
and peer judges, agencies can look to those used in evaluating
magistrate and bankruptcy judges in the pilot and voluntary
programs that the Federal Judicial Center has developed,283 as well
as the surveys used in the 18 states with official programs for
evaluating the performance of state-court judges.284 As another
example, case-processing oals can help agencies assess non-ALJs'
efficiency, a key value for agencies with large dockets.
281 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 248, at 280-81 (1946). (noting that compensation for salaries
must be adjusted and prescribed "independently of agency ratings and recommendations");
VERKUIL, supra note 83, at 1101 ("Unlike almost all other federal executive branch
employees, administrative law judges are excluded from the civil service performance
appraisal system." (citation omitted)).
282 See Part IV.D.5.A.
283 See DARLENE R. DAVIS, JUDICIAL EVALUATION PILOT PROJECT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 1-2 (1991); FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 2003
ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2004), https://www.fje.gov/sites/default/files/2012/AnnRep03.pdf; FED
JUDICIAL CTR. 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2006), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2012/AnnRep05.pdf.
284 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., THE O'CONNOR JUDICIAL




But it is obviously important that the peer and litigant feedback
and goals do not influence case outcomes. For instance,
disappointed litigants may unfairly complain about non-ALJs and
their work product. The survey response rate from litigants can
inform how to take those responses into account as part of a non-
AL's appraisal. Permitting the non-ALJ an opportunity to respond
to the review can help ensure that the performance appraisal is fair
and based on correct underlying facts. Likewise, poorly designed
quantitative case-processing oals may unwittingly incentivize the
adjudicator to favor one party over another if the ease in ruling for
that party allows the adjudicator to decide more cases.285
Other factors may directly or indirectly require the appraiser to
consider the substance of non-ALJs' decisions. For instance,
agencies reported often reviewing non-ALJs' decisions and, to a
lesser extent, reversal rates. Relatedly, some agencies reported that
they consider factors that encourage the reviewer, directly or
indirectly, to consider the outcome and the non-ALJs' reasoning-
such as "achieving remedial goals of civil-penalty process,"
compliance with statutes and regulations, and "business results."
Although agencies have an interest in having non-ALJs rule
impartially, correctly, and consistently, agency review of these
qualities may result in non-ALJs favoring agency positions, despite
governing law. Indeed, many agencies reported that they do not
consider outcomes and some even have policies or customs to
prevent such consideration.286 Agencies that use clear assessment
criteria help ensure that outcomes are not part of the assessment.
Some agencies already seek to protect non-ALJ impartiality from
the appraisal processes. For instance, the Coast Guard reported
that it prohibits data collection on, among other things, the number
of agency positions upheld or number of penalties assessed in
enforcement proceedings. The IRS requires supervisors to certify
that outcomes did not affect the appraisal. Other agencies have
assigned non-ALJ assessment to other agency adjudicators who
permit review of those assessments (although review has proved
unnecessary to date).
285 For instance, approving a claimant's request for benefits may require more or less work
from the adjudicator, depending on the nature of the agency's internal review and decision-
making requirements.
2 See supra Part IV.D.5.B.
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If agencies have concerns over non-ALJs' decision-making,
agencies can implement programs, in lieu of appraisals, to mitigate
partiality concerns. State agencies have reported success in
collaborative, peer-review assessment of decisions in which agency
officials discuss how others may have decided similar matters.287
The key is that the non-ALJs can receive feedback in a less
adversarial posture than a performance appraisal.
Non-ALJ performance appraisals that do not consider outcomes
and the decision-making process also mitigate concerns over paying
non-ALJs bonuses. Agencies responded to our question on the
existence of precautions in the performance-appraisal process for
fewer than half of non-ALJ types. Examining the de facto and de
jure nature of the performance appraisals can help ensure that
appraisers do not consider decisional outcomes and are clear and
transparent for non-ALJs and the public alike.
Agencies will want to ensure that the appraising official has no
interest in the non-ALJs' decisional outcomes. For instance, an
agency official who administers the appraisals and also supervises
the agency's investigative or prosecutorial functions would have a
potential conflict of interest.
C. NON-ALJ REMOVAL
1. Agencies might consider promulgating clear grounds for non-
ALJs' removal from their adjudicatory roles or for other adverse
action against them.
The threat of at-will removal (or other adverse action) is a potent
stick for ensuring that a subordinate does the bidding of the
removing official. As the Supreme Court stated in the context of the
president's and principal officers' power to remove other officials,
"one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot
be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against
the latter's will." 2 8 8
Whether or not the agency will actually threaten to remove non-
ALJs who rule against agency positions is not the only concern.
287 See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 1-2 (2017) (discussing positive effects on efficiency and consistency that peer-review
had in food-safety inspections in King County, Washington).
288 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010)
(quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
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Instead, agencies must not create the impression (for either non-
ALJs or outsiders) that a non-ALJ's employment or position as a
judge is dependent on the caprice of the agency. When the agency is
also a party, the impression is magnified because the agency-party
appears to have "[chosen] the judge in [its] own [case]."289
Prohibiting agencies from removing or disciplining non-ALJs except
for specified causes may ensure both the appearance and reality of
impartiality. Yet our findings indicate that agencies provide for-
cause removal for only three types of non-ALJs.290
Providing for-cause discipline or removal via regulation is not
unprecedented. The Department of Justice, for example, has done
so in the context of protecting a special counsel from the attorney
general's at-will removal.291 Protecting adjudicators from at-will
removal or discipline can "help create legitimacy" for executive
decision-making.292
To be meaningful, the protection for non-ALJs should provide
clear guidance on the suitable grounds for good-cause removal. An
agency can remove ALJs only for "good cause" as the MSPB
determines-a decision the MSPB makes for itself.2 9 3 But for most
of the civil service,294 an agency makes the initial determination of
whether removal or discipline is appropriate either to "promote the
efficiency of the service"295 or respond to "unacceptable
performance,"296 subject to deferential administrative appellate
ieview by the MSPB.2 9 7 Merely establishing a "good cause" standard
would have no effect on MSPB's role in the review, and it would
289 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).
290 See supra Part IV.D.6. Some non-ALJs who were not reported as part of our survey have
statutory protection from removal. See supra note 88 (discussing boards of contract appeals).
291 See 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) (2017) ("The Attorney General may remove a Special Counsel
for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause,
including violation of Departmental policies.").
292 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 522 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
293 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
294 Slightly different procedures apply to the SES. See id. § 3592 (2012) (requiring a hearing
before an official whom the MSPB designates, but not permitting an appeal to the MSPB
itself).
295 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012).
296 Id. § 4303(a) (2012).
297 See id. § 7701(c)(1) (reviewing adverse actions under the substantial evidence standard
for "unacceptable performance," and reviewing efficiency-based actions under the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard).
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provide little to no clarity as to the appropriate grounds for adverse
actions.
Instead, agencies' efforts may be better spent providing guidance
on how to understand these statutory terms (i.e., "efficiency of the
service" and "unacceptable performance") in the context of agency
adjudicators. Moreover, agencies may also consider providing
guidance on when non-ALJs may be legitimately reassigned (an
action which is generally not covered under the other statutory
regimes)298 to mitigate concerns that reassignment is a guise for
moving a non-ALJ to another role if the agency is unhappy with his
or her decisions.
Providing clear grounds for adverse action need not serve as a
straightjacket for agencies. For instance, some agencies take
account of quantitative case-processing goals.299 They could also
account for other criteria on non-ALJs' performance appraisals, as
long as they clarify how scoring on those appraisals affects the
standard for removal or discipline. The criteria for good-cause
removal and for performance appraisals can together provide clear
guidance to non-ALJs and their supervisors. We do not attempt here
to instruct agencies on the appropriate grounds for their non-ALJs'
removal or discipline. The key is to provide sufficient guidance in
the regulation to mitigate any concerns that the substance of the
non-ALJs' decisions influences disciplinary decisions.
Aside from defining the standard for removal, the regulation can
clarify, to the extent permitted by law,300 how the agency will decide
whether to remove non-ALJs. The agency might consider who
should make the removal decision-other non-ALJs within the
agency, non-ALJ supervisors, the head of the agency, a panel of
individuals outside of the agency (such as judges from other
agencies, regulated parties, and agency officials), or some
combination of these possibilities. A panel format requires
298 See WoRKFORCE RESTRUCTURING: SUMMARY OF REASSIGNMENT, OPM.GOV,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/workforce-restructuring/Summary-of-
Reassignment] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (noting agency's broad discretion to reassign
employees).
299 See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding SSA's implementation
of "reasonable production goals" for its ALJs).
30 See, e.g., § 7513(b)-(c); § 4303(b)-(d); § 7701(a). For guidance on the removal and
discipline process, see ADVERSE ACTIONS, supra note 57, at 55, which describes the full
process in detail with references to legal authority.
98 [Vol. 53:1
NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS
agreement from a majority of participants who have different
interests in administrative adjudication, such as a mix of non-ALJs,
regulated parties, and supervisors.301 But different agencies have
different resources, needs, and forms of adjudication that may make
other options more suitable. Even a panel of the agencies' non-ALJs
alone can provide internal monitoring and is common in other
adjudicatory contexts.302 Agencies will also want to consider how the
non-ALJ can respond to the threatened removal and the benefits of
requiring specific findings and reasons for removal to guard against
impermissible factors affecting the removal decision.303
Agencies will want to consider how to protect non-ALJs who
perform duties other than adjudication. The types of other duties
vary and thus present different concerns, but it may behoove
agencies to consider consolidating adjudication functions into as few
agency officials as possible to limit the reach of for-cause protections
and, as discussed earlier, to limit the duties that non-ALJs may
perform. Agencies might also consider how to account for the non-
ALJs' other duties when defining which actions provide grounds for
removal or other adverse action.
Because of the OPM's regulations and the MSPB's significant
role in disciplinary actions, we encourage agencies to work with
OPM and MSPB officials for advice and to consult their guidance
materials to ensure that any action that agencies take to promote
their non-ALJs' impartiality does not inadvertently conflict with
other statutory or regulatory law.
so1 To further separation of functions, we do not recommend including agency officials that
prosecute or investigate on behalf of the agency.
302 As ACUS has recognized, multi-judge peer-review panels, despite inherent concerns
over self-interest or peer-protection, are common for judicial discipline or removal in state
judicial settings. See VERKUTL ET AL., supra note 83, at 1027. In state settings, disciplinary
panels typically include both attorneys and non-attorneys as well.
3 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) (2017) ("The Attorney General shall inform the Special
Counsel in writing of the specific reason for his or her removal.").
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D. AGENCY TRANSPARENCY AND ASSESSMENT
1. To further transparency, salience, and efficacy, agencies might
consider using notice-and-comment rulemaking when promulgating
provisions that concern non-ALJ independence.
Promulgating notice-and-comment rules that concern non-ALJ
hiring, oversight, and discipline and removal can encourage
transparency and binding effect for non-ALJs' protections. Of
course, agency rules concerning personnel policies are not subject to
notice-and-comment requirements under the APA,304 and thus
agency personnel matters, like the DOJ regulation concerning
special counsel, are usually addressed in interpretative rules or
other less formal formats. In many instances, notice-and-comment
would be of little value because the public would have little
information or expertise to provide thorough comments and the
personnel policies would not be especially useful or important to
those outside the agency. But because non-ALJs' independence may
affect the public, agencies voluntarily using notice-and-comment
rulemaking-as agencies do in other contexts305-makes sense for
personnel matters related to non-ALJs' independence. The use of
notice-and-comment rulemaking has costs (both as to time and
money), but it provides numerous benefits. Rulemaking provides
more awareness of non-ALJs' status than less formal action.
Relatedly, because an agency must use notice-and-comment
procedures to amend or repeal a rule, notice-and-comment
rulemaking facilitates public awareness of any amendment or
repeal. The public, including regulated parties who are directly
affected by Non-ALJ Hearings, may also provide useful comments
as part of the rulemaking process and thereby improve the agency's
internal governance in the sensitive area of agency adjudication,
where agencies must balance fairness concerns with the agency's
ability to achieve its statutory mission. The comment period may
give other agencies the opportunity to share insights as to how it
promotes non-ALJ impartiality, providing the agency the chance to
learn from other agencies. Finally, the rulemaking process requires
30 See, e.g., §§ 553(a)(2), (b)(3)(A) (exempting "a matter relating to agency management or
personnel" from § 553).
305 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10, 669 (5th ed. 2010)
(noting that some agencies have often accepted ACUS recommendations to waive APA
§ 553(a)(2)'s exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking).
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agencies to produce a concise explanation of the agency's rules,
providing transparency as to the agency's reasoning.
All this said, ACUS has previously recommended that agencies
use procedural regulations that are published in the Federal
Register and the Code of Federal Regulations but exempt from
notice and comment.306 Procedural regulations may be most
appropriate when agencies grant non-ALJs strong forms of
independence, as we recommend above. The public is likely to agree
with the agency's action, thereby diminishing the value of soliciting
comments.
As a final matter, transparency and certainty over non-ALJs'
independence matters not only to those outside the agency. The
agency and the non-ALJs, too, can benefit from having concrete
protections, prohibitions, and guidance in place.
Agencies' posting their rules with their other adjudication
materials on their websites can provide additional and continuous
transparency and awareness.307 Agencies may clearly title their
rules or the website links to help the public review provisions
designed to protect non-ALJs' independence. Moreover, providing a
concise, easy-to-read summary of the relevant provisions to parties
early in the litigation can promote non-agency parties' confidence in
the Non-ALJ Hearings.
306 See Recommendation 92-1: The Procedural and Practice Rule Exemption from the APA
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. 30101, 30102 (July 8, 1992)
(explaining that procedural rules should be exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking if
they meet certain requirements).
R See Recommendation 2017-1: Adjudication Materials on Agency Websites, 82 Fed. Reg.
31039, 31039 (July 5, 2017) (explaining the factors agencies should consider when publishing







The Administrative Conference of the United States commissioned
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
(IAALS) at the University of Denver and Professor Kent Barnett at
the University of Georgia School of Law to (1) collect data on agency
adjudicators who are not "Administrative Law Judges" and (2)
provide recommendations to agencies for best practices concerning
hiring, overseeing, and removing these adjudicators.
Data on these adjudicators throughout the federal government are
extremely limited. We are asking for your help in answering the
following questions about your agency's practices concerning the
relevant administrative adjudications and administrative officials,
as defined in Question 1. We are not seeking the respondent's
personal experiences.
We ask that you complete the survey by March 3, 2017. Please
direct any questions to Professor Kent Barnett (706.542.5169 or
khbarn@uga.edu).
Thank you for contributing your valuable time to this project.
PART A: INTRODUCTION
Q1 Please list the name of your agency in the first block. If your
responses pertain to only one subcomponent (e.g., an office, bureau,
or division) of that agency, please list that subcomponent in the
second box.
(For instance, if you are responding for the Drug Enforcement
Agency only, please list the "Department of Justice" as your agency
in the first box below and the DEA as its subcomponent in the
second box. Or, for example, if you are responding for the U.S. Postal
Service as a whole, please list "U.S. Postal Service" in the agency





Q2 This survey concerns agency officials who preside over a certain
subset of agency adjudications that permit oral hearings. The
relevant "oral hearings," as the term is used in this survey, have the
following characteristics:
* One of the parties to the adjudication can-by
statute, regulation, or other law-obtain an oral hearing
over which an agency official presides to present evidence,
even if most matters are handled through written
submissions without an oral hearing,
and
* the presiding agency official is not a member or
commissioner of the agency, and is not an
"Administrative Law Judge." Instead, the agency official
goes by another title, such as Administrative Judge,
Administrative Appeals Judge, Administrative Patent
Judge, Board of Contract Appeals Judge, Veterans Law
Judge, Immigration Judge, Presiding Officer, Hearing
Officer, etc. For ease of reference, this survey will often
refer to these presiding agency officials as "non-ALJs."
The relevant "oral hearings" do not include "public hearings" in
which members of the public are invited to make statements or an
initial "front-line" agency decision when that initial decision is
followed by an evidentiary hearing before an agency or court.
Does your agency provide oral hearings as defined here?
o Yes
o No
If No, skip to end of survey.
PART B: TYPES OF ORAL HEARINGS
Q3 An agency may have different kinds of "oral hearings," for
instance, to hear matters related to different regulatory programs,
different kinds of proceedings under an agency program (e.g.,
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enforcement vs. awarding benefits), different parties (e.g., claims
between private parties vs. claims between a private party and an
agency), or different phases of litigation (e.g., an initial oral hearing
before non-ALJs and later appellate proceedings before non-ALJs).
A series of questions follows concerning each type of oral hearing
identified.
If your agency provides more than one type of oral hearings, please
identify the first type on the next screen. Subsequent questions will
ask you to identify additional types of oral hearings, once you
answer a series of questions related to the first type.
Please identify one type of oral hearings that your agency
provides.
Q4 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, what is the title of the non-
ALJs who preside? (Select all that apply.)
O Administrative Judge
" Administrative Appeals Judge
" Administrative Patent Judge
L Board of Contract Appeals Judge





L Other (Please identify.)
Q5 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, how many non-ALJs does
your agency employ full-time (whether or not duties include
matters other than adjudication)?
Q6 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, if your agency borrows non-
ALJs from another agency (who are employed full-time by their
agencies, whether or not their duties include matters other than
[Vol. 53: 1104
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adjudication), how many non-ALJs does it borrow? From which
agency or agencies does it borrow?
Q7 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, are any of the non-
ALJs not full-time agency employees? (For instance, do any of the
non-ALJs work part-time as contractors or work directly for outside




Q8 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, please indicate how many
non-ALJs are not full-time agency employees.
Q9 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, is the agency for which the
non-ALJ works one of the parties to the oral hearing?
Yes
No
Q10 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, is the non-ALJ's decision
final within the agency without any further action by agency




If Yes, skip to Q12.
Q11 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, please indicate what
further action by agency officials is required to produce a final
agency decision. (Select all that apply.)
E Mandatory administrative appeal
El Execution of order by higher-ranking official or agency
head(s)
E Other (Please identify.)
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Q12 For [type of oral hearings] hearings, is there any appellate
process within the agency (whether a proceeding before a non-ALJ,
an ALJ, or the head of the agency)?
o Yes
o No
If No, skip to Q14.
Q13 Please identify the appellate process available within the
agency for [type of oral hearings] hearings. (Select all that apply.)
0 Automatic administrative appellate review
O Discretionary administrative appellate review
E Administrative appellate review is heard by an appellate
panel (not the head(s) of the agency)
E Administrative appellate review is heard by the head(s) of
the agency
E Administrative appellate review is heard by another
agency official
E Administrative appellate review is heard by an appellate
panel within another agency or by head(s) of another
agency
E Other (Please identify.)
Q14 Does the agency apply any quantitative case-processing oals
for [type of oral hearings] hearings?
o Yes
o No
If No, skip to Q16.
Q15 Please describe case-processing oals for [type of oral hearings]
hearings and how the agency enforces those goals.
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Q16 Does your agency provide a type of oral hearings in addition
to [type of oral hearings] hearings?
o Yes
o No
If Yes, skip to Q3.
PART C: TYPES OF NON-ALJS
Q17 An agency may use different types of non-ALJs who go by
different titles (e.g., Administrative Judge, Administrative Appeals
Judge, Administrative Patent Judge, Board of Contract Appeals
Judge, Veterans Law Judge, Immigration Judge, Presiding Officer,
Hearing Officer, Hearing Examiner). A series of questions follows
concerning each type of non-ALJs.
If your agency uses more than one type of non-ALJs, please enter
the first type on the next screen. Subsequent questions will ask you
to identify additional types of non-ALJs, once you answer a series of
questions related to the first type.
If two types of non-ALJs are treated differently by the agency but
share the same title, please list them separately and distinguish
between them in your identification of the types of non-ALJs.
Please identify one type of non-ALJs that your agency uses.
Q18 Please identify the nature of the hearings over which [type of
non-ALJ](s) preside. (Select all that apply.)
D Governmental benefits
L Licensing
l Enforcement (imposing a fine, injunction, or other penalty)
l Government contracts
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0 Disputes between different governmental agencies
E Disputes between private parties
E Other (Please Identify.)
Q18 Which federal occupational series applies to your [type of non-





Q19 Please indicate the number of [type of non-ALJ](s) under each







































Other (Please identify the pay plan and number.)
Other (Please identify the pay plan and number.)
Other (Please identify the pay plan and number.)
Q20 Please identify any minimum qualifications for hiring an
employee initially and directly as [type of non-ALJ](s). (Select all
that apply.)
O Law degree
El Years of government service (If so, enter number of years.)
El Years of legal practice (If so, enter number of years.)
El Years of litigation experience (If so, enter number of years.)
O Years of legal practice in regulatory issue in agency
hearings (If so, enter number of years.)
O Prior military service
El Examination or review of written work product
El Expertise in regulatory area at issue in agency hearings
E- Professional demeanor
El References
El Other (Please identify.)
El Not applicable. The agency hires no employees initially
and directly as [type of non-ALJ](s).
Q21 Please identify any minimum qualifications for moving an




0 Years of government service (If so, enter number of years.)
m Years of legal practice (If so, enter number of years.)
o Years of litigation experience (If so, enter number of years.)
El Years of legal practice in regulatory issue in agency
hearings (If so, enter number of years.)
El Prior military service
E Examination or review of written work product




O Other (Please identify.)
El Not applicable. The agency does not move existing
employees into new positions as [type of non-ALJ] (s).
Q22 Are [type of non-ALJ](s) subject to a probationary period when
they begin their adjudicatory duties?
o Yes
o No
Q23 Are [type of non-ALJ](s) appointed for a term of years?
o Yes
o No
Q24 Are [type of non-ALJ](s) permitted to engage in ex parte
communications as to factual or legal matters with employees (aside
from those who work directly for the non-ALJ) or members of the
agency?
o Yes, ex parte communications are permitted and are not
limited
o Yes, ex parte communications are permitted, but are
limited in certain ways
" No, ex parte communications are not permitted
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If Yes, skip to Q27.
Q25 Please identify the source of any limitations on ex parte
communications by [type of non-ALJ](s). (Select all that apply.)
El Statute




El Other (Please identify.)
Q26 Please identify the nature of any limitations on ex parte
communications by [type of non-ALJ](s). (Select all that apply.)
El Prohibited from communicating with all agency officials
(other than those who work directly for the non-ALJ) as
to disputed facts
El Prohibited from communicating with all agency officials
(other than those who work directly for the non-ALJ) as
to disputed legal issues. Please identify the agency
officials with whom [type of non-ALJ](s) may not
communicate.
El Prohibited from communicating with certain agency
officials (other than those who work directly for the non-
ALJ) as to disputed facts. Please identify the agency
officials with whom [type of non-ALJ](s) may not
communicate.
El Prohibited from communicating with certain agency
officials (other than those who work directly for the non-
ALJ) as to disputed legal issues
El Prohibited from communicating with individuals outside
the agency as to disputed facts
El Prohibited from communicating with individuals outside
the agency as to disputed legal issues
El Other (Please describe.)
Q27 Please identify any authority that precludes [type of non-
ALJ](s) from performing duties for the agency other than
adjudicating disputes (or administering the adjudicatory process).

















Q28 Please identify the nature of any limitations on the ability
of [type of non-ALJ](s) to perform other duties. (Select all that
apply.)
El Prohibited from performing any duties aside from
adjudication
El Prohibited from performing investigative or prosecutorial
duties
El Not prohibited from performing other duties
El N/A (because the non-ALJ works for an agency that only
adjudicates disputes and lacks rule making, investigative,
or enforcement authority)
El Other (Please identify.)
Q29 Are the offices of [type of non-ALJ](s) physically separated
from others within the agency?
o Yes
o No
Q30 To whom do [type of non-ALJ](s) directly report?
o Chief [type of non-AL]
o Agency official who also supervises investigation or
enforcement proceedings
o Agency head(s)
o Other (Please identify.)
If Chief [type of non-ALJI, go to Q31; if not, skip to Q32.
Q31 To whom does the Chief [type of non-ALJ](s) directly report?





o Other (Please identify.)
Q32 What limitations, if any, exist as to who may supervise [type of
non-ALT](s)?
Q33 Are [type of non-ALJ](s) subject to performance appraisals?
o Yes
o No
If No, skip to Q39.
Q34 Please identify germane considerations for performance
appraisals of [type of non-ALJ](s). (Select all that apply.)
O Case-processing oals
l Input from parties/litigants
E Peer review
E Review of decisions
O Reversal rates
0 Other (Please identify.)
Q35 Are [type of non-ALJ](s) eligible for pay bonuses?
o Yes
o No
If No, skip to Q39.
Q36 Did any [type of non-ALJ](s) receive a pay bonus in the last




Q37 Please indicate the number of [type of non-ALJ](s) who
received bonuses and the amount (or ranges) of those bonuses.




Q38 Please describe any specific precautions the agency takes to
mitigate concerns over how receiving performance appraisals and/or
bonuses may impact the impartiality of [type of non-ALJ](s).
Q39 Do [type of non-ALJ](s) have any protection from at-will
removal from their positions, aside from standard protections for
federal employees? (For example, does any regulation or statute
provide that the agency can remove [type of non-ALJ](s) for only
"good cause" or similar grounds?)
o Yes
o No
If No, skip to Q42.
Q40 What is the source of the protection for [type of non-ALJ](s)
from at-will removal? (Select all that apply.)
l Statute
l Regulation
E Internal guidance document
El Custom
l Other (Please identify.)
Q41 Please describe the nature of the protection for [type of non-
ALJ (s) from at-will removal.
Q42 Does any requirement exist for [type of non-ALJ](s) to




If No, skip to Q44.
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Q43 Please identify the source of the disqualification requirement
for [type of non-ALJ](s) who cannot serve as an unbiased
adjudicator. (Select all that apply.)
O Statute
O Regulation
D Internal guidance document
E Custom
0 Other (Please identify.)




If Yes, skip to Q17.




Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. Please click





SURVEYED AGENCIES - SUBCOMPONENTS AND RESPONSES
Agency Subcomponent Response as to
Oral Hearings
Administrative Office Fair Employment Yes





Board for Correction for









Judge Advocate General No
Central Intelligence Office of Public Affairs N/A
Agency








Agency Subcomponent Response as to
Oral Hearings
Commission on Civil No
Rights
Commodity Futures











Patent Trial and Appeal
Department of Board
Commerce U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office Yes
Armed Services Board of Yes
Contract Appeals
Department of Defense Legal Services Office, N/A
Civilian Health
Office of Hearings and N/A
Appeals
Department of Office of Hearings and Yes
Education Appeals




Agency Subcomponent Response as to
Oral Hearings
Office of Secretary, Yes
Department of Health Departmental Appeals





Department of U.S. Customs-Border





Department of Federal Housing
Housing and Urban Administration N/A
Development
Department of the Office of Hearings and
Interior Appeals N/A
Executive Office for Yes
Immigration Review
Board of Immigration





Benefits Review Board Yes
Department of Labor Employee
Compensation Appeals No
Board




Agency Subcomponent Response as to
Oral Hearings
Department of State No
Department of N/A
Transportation
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Yes
and Trade Bureau
Department of the Internal Revenue
Treasury Service Yes
Office of the Comptroller
































Federal Mediation and No
Conciliation Service
Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review No
Commission










Library of Congress Yes
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Agency Subcomponent Response as to
Oral Hearings
Merit Systems Regional and Field




a . National Endowment N/ANational Foundation frteAt
on the Arts and
























Agency Subcomponent Response as to
Oral Hearings

















TYPES OF HEARINGS AND TYPES OF NON-ALJs
BY AGENCY - SUBCOMPONENT
Agency- Types of Hearings Types of Non-ALJs
Subcomponent
Administrative Office
of the United States Fair Employment
Courts - Fair Hearing Officer
EmplomentPractices hearingsEmployment
Practices Office
Commodity Futures Wage garnishment
Trading Commission Statutory
- Office of disqualification Judgment Officer
Proceedings Reparations awards
Department of
Agriculture - Private party disputes
Agricultural involving produce Presiding Officer
Marketing Service, transactions
Specialty Crops
Department of Claims between
Commerce - Patent private parties Administrative
Trial and Appeal Claims between a tent Judge
Board private party and
agency
Department of Patent Examiner
Commerce - U.S. .
Paten andinterviews with patent Patent ExaminerPatent and .plcat
Trademark Office apphcants
Department of Oral hearings
Defense - Armed involving private Board of Contract
Services Board of parties and the DoD, Appeals Judge, or
Contract Appeals DoD components, Administrative Judge
NASA, or CIA
Appeals of actions
ordering the return of
Department of funds, imposition of
Education - Office of fines, or the Administrative Judge
















Department of Health Agency enforcement. actions against
and Human Services .in s BorMeb
- Office of Secretary, aBoard Member
Departentalcorporations
Deatm l Grant disallowances
and terminations
Department of ii
Class I civil penalty
Homeland Security - Hearing Officer
Coast Guard
Department of Justice Board Member
- Executive Office for Removal proceedings immigration Judge
Immigration Review ImmigrationnJudge
Oral arguments for
Department of Labor parties, which may Administrative




Treasury - Alcohol Labor arbitrations Labor Arbitrator




Department of the conferences for
Treasury - Internal examination cases
Revenue Service Settlement
conferences for non- Appeals Officer
CDP collection cases
Board of Veterans' Veterans Law Judge
Department of Appeals hearings




Agency- Types of Hearings Types of Non-ALJs
Subcomponent
Equal Employment Federal employment
Opportunity disputes re: unlawful Administrative Judge
Commission discrimination
Environmental Regional Judicial
Protection Agency - Enforcement hearings Officer
Region 9
Presentation of Attorney- Examiner
Environmental matters in opposition (Suspension and
Prtetin gecy-(PMIO) meetings Disbarment HearingProtection Agency - Officer who has a




Insurance Miscellaneous Presiding Officer
Corporation
Maritime Informal claims Small Claims Officer
Fedra License revocation.
Commission prcens Hearing Officer
proceedings
Federal Labor
Relations Authority - Age
Office of the General ncy program Hearing Officer
Counsel
Senior Attorney or
Government Bid protest Assistant General
__________________Counsel






licenses to use Copyright Royalty






Mrt te msion BoEmployment disputes Chief AdministrativeProtection Board Judge
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Agency- Types of Hearings Types of Non-ALJs
Subcomponent
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